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 When Fund Management Skill is More Valuable? Feng Dong* and John A. Doukas** 
ABSTRACT 
Does fund management skill allow managers to identify mispriced securities more 
accurately and thereby make better portfolio choices resulting in superior fund 
performance when noise trading—a natural setting to detect skill — is more prevalent? 
We find skilled-fund managers with superior past performance to generate persistent 
excess risk-adjusted returns and experience significant capital inflows, especially in high 
sentiment times, high stock dispersion and economic expansion states when price signals 
are noisier. This pattern persists after we control for lucky bias, using the “false discovery 
rate” approach, which permits to disentangle manager “skill” from “luck”. 
JEL Classification: G11, G14, G20, G23 
Keywords: Mutual fund performance; investor sentiment; mispricing, fund manager skill 
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“…noise creates the opportunity to trade profitably, but at the same time makes it 
difficult to trade profitably.”  - Fisher Black, 1986 
1. Introduction 
Apparently increasing evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which 
financial markets are informationally inefficient as a result of investor cognitive biases 
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related to the noisiness of information (Tversky and Kahneman 1974; Hilbert 2012). 
Undoubtedly, noise trading activity is mostly prevalent when markets are crowded by 
sentiment driven noise traders and it has been held responsible for much of the market 
uncertainty during the last two decades. However, its impact on the performance of 
actively managed mutual fund remains unknown.1 Shedding light on this issue is very 
important given that the bulk of investment activity has been delegated to professional 
fund managers. Hence, in this study we examine the extent to which market sentiment, as 
the most prominent state of market noise relative to others (i.e., high market dispersion 
states; economic expansions; stock mispricing, using a set of 11 market anomalies to 
identify overpriced stocks (Stambaugh et al., 2012) and market volatility), affects the 
performance of mutual fund managers and, especially, that of skilled fund managers? As 
Black (1986) argues, noise traders and professional investors with low levels of skill 
cannot discern valuable information from market noise and may treat market noise as 
useful information and trade based on it. We address this question by investigating 
whether market sentiment influences fund alphas, as noted by Miller (1997), which, in 
turn, based on the insight of Black (1986), makes it less (more) difficult for high (low) 
skill fund managers to carry out profitable trades. Specifically, we examine the capacity 
of U.S. domestic equity fund managers in adding value during periods of high sentiment, 
used as an “acid” test of management skill, when it is more difficult to identify profitable 
stocks. Unlike previous studies, we assess the added value of fund skill in high sentiment 
1 Campbell and Vuolteenaho (2004) separate stock market returns, into that due to changing forecasts of future 
cashflows (which tend to be non-mean-reverting) and changing forecasts of market discount rates (which are related to 
investor sentiment and is mean-reverting). They find that changes in discount rate forecasts (i.e., changes in investor 
sentiment) is a major driver of market volatility. 
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periods conditional on funds’ past performance, capital inflows, high market dispersion, 
economic expansions, equity mispricing, based on a set of 11 market anomalies to 
identify overpriced stocks (Stambaugh et al., 2012), and market volatility conditions that 
make it more (less) likely for high (low) skill fund managers to improve and sustain fund 
performance.  
While a large body of the literature arrives at the conclusion that actively 
managed funds, on average, underperform passively managed funds, recent papers find 
that funds with certain characteristics can outperform the market benchmark.2 However, 
previous studies do not examine whether fund managers create added value when 
markets are crammed by high levels of noise as a result of investor sentiment, which is 
widely recognized as a market state of high noise trading activity. Other studies 
document that active fund manager skill varies over time with macroeconomic conditions 
(e.g., Christopherson, Ferson, and Glassman, 1998; and Avramov and Wermers, 2006). 
This literature emphasizes that fund managers may have particular skills in managing 
stocks during a certain phase of the business cycle.3 Whereas these studies show that 
fund alpha in various industry sectors is related to real economic forces, they do not shed 
light on the important question whether fund alpha is linked to fund managers’ skill, 
particularly, in high investor sentiment states of the equity market when high (low) skill 
fund managers are expected to execute more (less) profitable trades. Unlike the previous 
2 For example, Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng (2005), Cremers and Petajisto (2009), and Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and 
Starks (2016) document that industry concentrated portfolio holdings or a large deviation of holdings away from a 
benchmark can outperform such a benchmark, net of expenses. 
3 For instance, a technology manager may produce a higher alpha when short-term interest rates are high, and the credit 
spread is low, while a consumer staples manager may produce alphas when short rates are low, and the credit spread is 
high. 
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literature, this paper aims to quantify whether fund management skill delivers high alpha 
during high sentiment times, when more managerial talent and resources (i.e. costs of 
gathering and processing private information is higher) are required to separate real 
information and market noise. That is, when the signal-to-noise ratio is lower. While a 
higher level of investor sentiment presents a more difficult environment for all active 
managers to pick valuable stocks and sectors, it should be less daunting to skilled fund 
managers who possess the ability (better informed traders) to discern noise from real 
information.  
As explained by Black (1986), noise trader participation in the market, triggered 
by investor optimism, can move asset prices away from fundamental values. In fact, since 
investor sentiment has been shown to influence noise trader investment behavior and, in 
turn, asset prices (Miler, 1977; Hirshleifer and Shumway, 2003; Dowling and Lucey, 
2005; Edmans, Garcia, and Norli, 2007; Kaplanski and Levy, 2010; and Bialkowski, 
Etebari, and Wisniewski, 2012), it stands to reason that skilled fund managers would 
outperform the market benchmark and their low skilled counterparts by being able to 
better discern information from noise when the market is crowded by noise traders. 
Additionally, since noise trader activity is asymmetric across optimistic and pessimistic 
sentiment periods unsophisticated investors are more likely to enter the stock market 
during high sentiment times (Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Lamont and Thaler, 2003). 
Moreover, based on the insights of Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan (2012) and Antoniou, 
Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013), noise traders are more likely to drive prices away 
from intrinsic values by being reluctant to realize losses (sell losers) during periods of 
optimism to avoid regret and cognitive dissonance. Therefore, to the extent that skilled 












fund managers trade more on (private) information about the true value of financial assets 
under management, in contrast to the market benchmark and their low skill counterparts, 
they are expected to deliver more value during high sentiment periods. In sum, the 
important question whether fund managers’ performance is affected by noise trading 
activity, prominent in high investor sentiment times, a natural setting to detect if fund 
managers possess skill, warrants investigation. To shed light on this issue we posit that 
the variation of skill across fund managers is a key determinant of fund performance 
(alpha). 
Moreover, in contrast to the previous literature that examines whether fund 
managers try to exploit investor sentiment by deploying sentiment-based (timing) 
strategies in order to attract capital flows (Massa and Yadav, 2015) or whether funds tilt 
their portfolios toward better performing stocks when they buy (sell) stocks that are 
highly sensitive to market sentiment, preceding an increase (decrease) in investor 
sentiment (Cullen, Gasbarro, Le, and Monroe, 2013), in this study we treat sentiment as a 
market condition, not as a risk factor that skilled managers actively time investor 
sentiment by modifying fund strategies based on their sentiment prediction.4 While our 
evidence is consistent with the previous literature showing that skilled fund managers 
outperform their low skill peers across time (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013; Berk and van 
Binsbergen, 2015), we distinctly document that fund managers’ stock-selectivity skill is 
more profitable during high than low sentiment periods due to short selling limitations 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) and costlier value-relevant information that permit asset 
4 Specifically, Massa and Yadav (2015) consider the preferences of fund managers for holding stocks that react in a 
contrary manner to the level of investor sentiment or display a contrarian sentiment behavior. 
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prices to drift away from intrinsic values. Unlike Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and 
Veldkamp (2016), who argue that the time-varying fund performance is caused by fund 
managers’ optimally choosing to process information about aggregate shocks in 
recessions and idiosyncratic shocks in booms, we treat investor sentiment as a noisy 
market condition which allows us to determine whether skilled fund managers are able to 
outperform the market benchmark and their counterpart (average and low-skilled) 
managers. Our evidence, consistent with this conjecture, shows that skilled fund 
managers with superior past performance in high sentiment (noisy) periods consistently 
outperform the market benchmark and generate significantly and economically higher 
alpha than the average-skill and low-skill fund managers.  
Furthermore, since previous studies document that mutual fund investors tend to 
chase funds with superior past performance (Chevalier and Ellison, 1997; Sirri and 
Tufano, 1998), in this study we examine and find that funds with expert performance 
realize higher risk-adjusted returns than funds with average past returns. Consistent with 
our main findings, this investigation demonstrates that high-skill management funds 
exhibit superior past performance and experience significant capital inflows, especially 
during high sentiment periods.  
We employ two different management skill and fund performance measures over 
the 1990–2014 period. First, we use the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) selectivity method, 
which does not require the use of fund portfolio holdings (i.e., Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, 
and Wermers, 1997), and examine the relation between fund selectivity and performance 












across different states of investor sentiment.5 Second, following Berk and van Binsbergen 
(2015) we reexamine the validity of our original results by using their measures of 
management skill (i.e., skill ratio) and performance (i.e., the mean of the product of the 
gross abnormal return (alpha) and fund size (the value extracted by a fund from capital 
markets)). Our evidence, based on both measures, consistently shows that high market 
sentiment harms fund performance, but managers with above-average stock-picking skill 
manage to protect fund performance from the adverse effects of high investor sentiment. 
We also find that skilled fund managers have lower exposure to overvalued (mispriced) 
stocks and their performance does not appear to be adversely affected by dramatic 
investor capital flow changes. 
Another interesting question, which has received little attention in the literature 
(e.g. Baks, Metrick, and Wachter, 2001), is what percentage of the skilled active fund 
managers is consistently associated with higher excess risk-adjusted returns under 
different states of investor sentiment. The answer to this question is very important 
because more and more capital is flowing from individual investors to professional 
investment managers. Conducting a lucky bias analysis, as in Barras, Scaillet, and 
Wermers (2010), which allows us to examine what percentage of significant fund 
performance (alpha) is due to management skill and not to luck alone, we find that the 
percentage of skilled fund managers decreases considerably after controlling for lucky 
5 Amihud and Goyenko (2013) find better performance among funds that have lower R2 with respect to a multifactor 
model, which is supported by the literature on fund trading activity and its impact on performance (e.g. Kacperczyk, 
Sialm, and Zheng, 2005; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009, 2016; Wermers, 2003; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and Zheng, 2005; 
Cremers, Ferreira, Matos, and Starks, 2016; Kacperczyk and Seru 2007; Cohen, Polk, and Silli, 2010). Additionally, 
Pastor, Stambaugh, and Taylor (2017) establish a time series relation and show that funds deliver better performance 
after increasing their trading activity. 
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bias, while the portion of skilled fund managers who deliver significant alphas is much 
higher in high than low sentiment periods. This finding demonstrates the scarcity of skill 
fund management and the increasing share of index funds over recent times (Stambaugh, 
2014). 
Furthermore, we check the sensitivity of our results by carrying out a battery of 
robustness tests. We use stock mispricing as an alternative setting of noise trading 
activity, and consistently show that skilled fund managers create value by their ability to 
identify noise information and carry out profitable trades. In addition, we find that skilled 
fund managers do not appear to time investor sentiment. Finally, employing alternative 
measures of market sentiment, 6  we obtain qualitatively similar results to our main 
findings. Jointly, the evidence points that skilled managers generate high alphas in high 
sentiment periods and stock mispricing states suggests that they create value for fund 
investors when markets are populated by noisy investors (signals) and experience 
significant capital inflows by seizing investor attention. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the related 
literature and hypothesis development. Section 3 describes the data and empirical 
methodology. Section 4 presents empirical results. Section 5 provides robustness tests. 
Section 6 concludes. 
6 such as the Financial and Economic Attitudes Revealed by Search index (FEARS) (Da, Engelberg, and Gao, 2015), 
the credit market sentiment index, the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index (VIX), and the New York 
Stock Exchange based Arms Index (TRIN). 
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2. Related literature and hypothesis development 
Carhart (1997) shows that, when measured with a four-factor risk model, the 
average active U.S.-domiciled domestic equity mutual fund has experienced negative net-
of-expense alpha. In addition, Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (DGTW; 1997), 
who employ characteristics-based benchmarks, find that the average active U.S. equity 
fund can beat its benchmarks, gross of fees and trading costs. Further, DGTW finds that 
some active equity fund managers outperform their benchmarks, pre-costs, by a wide 
margin; other, more recent papers provide further insights into the characteristics of 
skilled funds (Brands, Brown, and Gallagher, 2005; Kacperczyk et al., 2005; Cremers 
and Petajisto, 2009; Cremers et al., 2016; and Dong and Doukas, 2019). 
From another perspective, Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp (2014) 
show that fund manager skill comes from the managers’ ability to anticipate micro- and 
macro-fundamentals, and the different abilities of institutional investors to gather and 
analyze information about the same firm can cause heterogenous opinions, which lead to 
different trading activities (Knyazeva, Knyazeva, and Kostovetsky, 2018). In addition, 
the previous literature shows that a fund attains superior performance if its manager 
focuses on the assets that s/he has specialized knowledge of. For example, Kacperczyk et 
al. (2005) found that funds focusing on some specific industries have better performance 
than the ones holding more diversified portfolios. Cohen, Frazzini, and Malloy (2007) 
showed that if fund managers and corporate board members have a close connection via 
shared education networks, fund managers prefer to place larger bets on those firms that 
such corporate board members serve and find that those funds perform significantly 
better on these holdings relative to their non-connected holdings. Kacperczyk and Seru 












(2007) reported that changing portfolio allocation based on public information decreases 
fund performance, which supports the argument that fund manager skill is coming from 
private information rather than public information. 
While most of this literature has focused on the stock-picking ability of fund 
managers, the findings on managers’ market-timing ability are ambiguous. Jiang, Yao, 
and Yu (2007), employing a single-index model using measures of market timing based 
on mutual fund holdings, find that, on average, active fund managers have positive 
market-timing abilities. However, as shown by Elton, Gruber, and Blake (2012), there is 
no evidence that market-timing strategy increases fund performance when a multi-index 
model is used. Interestingly, there might be a negative market-timing effect on fund 
performance due to the sector rotation decisions with respect to high-tech stocks. By 
adding timing-related variables to the basic model, which is proposed by Fama and 
French (1993) and Carhart (1997), denoted as the FFC model, Amihud and Goyenko 
(2013) found no evidence that high selectivity funds possess any market-timing skill. 
Meanwhile, few studies have focused on the question of whether the active fund 
managers’ skill varies with time. Von Reibnitz (2015), for example, shows that the 
market environment impacts on the effectiveness of active strategies, and highly skilled 
managers can produce superior returns in times of high cross-sectional dispersion in stock 
returns. Some studies have focused on the relationship between fund performance and the 
business cycle and report that active funds, on average, have a better performance in 
recessions than in expansions (Moskowitz, 2000; Glode, 2011; Kosowski, 2011; 
Kacperczyk, Van Nieuwerburgh, and Veldkamp 2014, 2016).  












Unlike previous studies, we argue that the activities of investors are not 
consistently rational and, thus, fund profitability can be affected by noise traders (signals). 
There are two reasons to suggest that investor sentiment can influence the profitability of 
a fund manager’s insight and analytical ability. First, the level of investor sentiment can 
affect both overall market returns and individual stock returns (Miller, 1977; Daniel, 
Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam, 1998; Hong and Stein, 1999; Amromin and Sharpe, 
2009; and Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam, 2015). Stocks during high sentiment 
periods are driven away from their fundamental values by naïve investors. Antoniou et al. 
(2015) find that the CAPM only holds during pessimistic periods when investor 
sentiment is low and asset prices are more likely to be close to their intrinsic values, 
which reveals that the effect of more unsophisticated investors entering the market during 
high sentiment states is dramatic. In optimistic times, however, the opposite is true with 
noise traders focusing on risky stocks, and thus overvaluing high beta stocks. As argued 
by Barberis and Thaler (2003), rational investors or arbitrageurs do not aggressively force 
prices back to fundamentals because betting against sentimental investor activities is 
costly and risky. Additionally, short-selling impediments of institutional investors, 
especially mutual funds, are also major obstacles to eliminating price overvaluation. 
Since more irrational and unsophisticated traders participate in financial markets during 
high sentiment periods, asset prices are more likely to be noisy and consequently more 
difficult to identify good investment opportunities. Hence, on average, stock-picking 
ability during high sentiment periods might be limited, thus resulting in fund 
underperformance. If fund managers’ skills, however, are based on firm-specific analytic 
abilities and information rather than noise, fund managers with high selectivity skill 












should be able to produce superior fund performance during high sentiment periods when 
stock prices are exposed to greater noise than during low sentiment periods. The ability 
of skilled fund managers to create value in high sentiment states is expected to depend on 
their analytical valuation skill to make profitable investment decisions and not by 
investing in overvalued stocks which are preferred by naive investors. In contrast, 
unsophisticated investors keep away from the equity market during low sentiment periods 
(Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Lamont and Thaler, 2003; Amromin and Sharpe, 2009; 
and Antoniou et al., 2015), with asset prices reverting to fundamental values. In low 
sentiment periods, stocks are traded at close to fundamental values, and this leaves less 
room for fund managers to realize significant high alphas. Taken together, these 
arguments lead us to expect that fund managers with high selectivity are more likely to 
outperform their low selectivity skill counterparts in high sentiment periods. 
Second, fund performance can be influenced by market noise due to market 
anomalies, which are created by irrational investor trading activities that are more 
pronounced in high sentiment periods (Stambaugh, Yu, and Yuan, 2012). Momentum is 
one of the most significant market anomalies, and it is described as the tendency of past 
winners (losers) to outperform (underperform) the market benchmark in the near future. 
Antoniou, Doukas, and Subrahmanyam (2013) find a strong connection between 
sentiment and momentum. They argue that during high sentiment periods, information 
signals that oppose the direction of sentiment travel slowly due to investors’ cognitive 
dissonance, and they show that the momentum strategy works only during optimistic 
(high sentiment) periods. In addition, due to short-sale constraints, mutual fund managers 
are more likely to bet on positive information. While stocks tend to be overvalued due to 












the momentum effect during high sentiment periods, stock prices will drift away from 
their intrinsic values and sophisticated fund managers should generate superior returns by 
taking advantage of this drift from true value during high sentiment times. That is, active 
fund managers with superior insight and analytical skill are expected not only to protect a 
fund’s performance from this price to value drift, but also produce a higher fund alpha in 
high investor sentiment periods when noise investor participation in the market is high. 
On the other hand, their inability to generate high alphas during low sentiment periods 
when asset prices are less noisy and near fundamental values may suggest that their 
superior insight and analytical skill is most relevant during high sentiment and noisy 
periods. Unlike previous studies, the novelty of this investigation is to shed light on 
whether fund managers’ performance varies across different states of investor sentiment 
and particularly whether fund investors benefit the most from their selectivity talent 
during high sentiment periods when market signals are noisy. That is, our objective is to 
examine whether the value created by fund managers is associated with their selectivity 
talent, especially in high sentiment times when markets are jammed by noise trading.  
3. Data and empirical methodology 
3.1 Data and sample selection 
Unlike most previous studies, which use the CRSP Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual 
Fund Database, we use the Bloomberg Fund Dataset, which is originally built for 
institutional investors in 1993 and is widely used in the finance industry nowadays. The 
dataset receives pricing and performance information from the fund management 
companies, administrators, and trustees directly, in the form of a feed or, more 












commonly, via automated email distribution channels with the entities. In addition, if one 
data point cannot pass the volatility threshold, which varies for each mutual fund based 
upon its past accepted volatility and the market in which the entity trades or prices, the 
data point will be rejected. These features make Bloomberg fund data reliable for 
academic studies and not suffering from the standard sample bias. Our data sample period 
covers 24 years from January 1990 to December 2014. We use 24-month time windows 
to estimate selectivity and past fund alphas, so the data were collected from December 
1987. We collected monthly raw returns for each fund if the fund had full return data for 
the 24-month estimation period.7 We also collected fund-level control variables that may 
be associated with the fund’s performance: turnover, which is the minimum of 
aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities divided by the total net assets of 
the fund, age, expanse ratio, which is the annual expense ratio of each fund, and total net 
assets (TNA). 
To make sure our sample does not suffer from survivorship bias, we collected 
data from funds with both alive and dead statuses. We also used several criteria to restrict 
our sample to actively managed U.S. domestic equity mutual funds. We only collected 
fund data if a fund met all the following standards: 1) geographical focus is the United 
States, 2) country of domicile is the United States, 3) asset class is equity, and 4) fund 
type is an open-ended mutual fund. Because we needed 24 months’ estimation periods 
and our sample period ended in December 2014, all observations were removed if the 
7 We use 24-month estimation window following Amihud and Goyenko (2013). In addition, as argued in Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013), making sure that the funds in the sample have been in the market for at least two years, can help to 
limit the effect of luck, since most unskilled but lucky fund managers cannot survive the market for a long run. The 
results are consistent when we use 12-month estimation window, but less significant.  
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 












fund had an inception date later than December 2012. We further eliminated other types 
of funds, such as index funds, balance funds, international funds, and sector funds, by 
deleting funds whose name contained the word “index,” “ind,” “S&P,” “DOW,” 
“Wilshire,” “Russell,” “global,” “fixed-income,” “international,” “sector,” and 
“balanced.” Following Von Reibnitz (2015), we required funds to have TNA of at least 
$15 million in December 2013. Overall, our sample contained 2190 mutual funds over 
the period from January 1990 to December 2014, with 273,557 observations. We set an 
estimation period of 24 months followed by a test month, and during the estimation 
period, we regressed monthly fund excess return (over the T-bill rate) on the FFC model 
factors and moved the window a month at a time. A detailed data collection comparison 
between this paper and the previous literature (Amihud and Goyenko, 2013; and Von 
Reibnitz, 2015) is presented in the Internet Appendix 1. 
Table 1 shows the summary statistics of the mutual funds in our sample. R2t-1 
estimations range from 0.219 to 0.991, with a mean value of 0.883 and a median value of 
0.922.8, 9 This shows a clear negatively skewed distribution, which indicates that around 
90% of the funds’ excess return variance can be explained by the market indexes 
variance. 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
8 Consistent with Amihud and Goyenko (2013), the top 0.5% and the bottom 0.5% R2 observations were deleted. The 
argument here is that funds with the highest R2 should be “closet indexers,” which have not been limited out by the 
sample selection criteria. Funds with the lowest R2 may be caused by estimation error. 
9 Following Armihud and Goyenko (2013), the statistics reported in Table 1 are estimated before we delete outlier 
observations. 
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The main sentiment measures used in this paper is the Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
sentiment index (BW)10 and the University of Michigan sentiment index (UM)11. Even 
though both optimistic and pessimistic beliefs, induced by high and low market 
sentiment, respectively, can affect asset prices, noise trading activity is more likely to be 
triggered by high market sentiment since in pessimistic times, noisy (optimistic) 
investors, as a major source of noise trading activity, are expected to exit the market. 
Additionally, investors holding pessimistic views are generally unwilling to sell short 
(Barber and Odean 2008), which contributes to the asymmetry effect of market sentiment 
on asset pricing. Thus, high sentiment index (i.e. above-average BW sentiment index or 
UM sentiment index) is used as a reliable proxy to pinpoint periods when financial 
markets are populated with noise trading activity. The BW index has been used widely in 
the finance literature and is constructed using five proxies of investors’ propensity to 
invest in stocks: trading volume (total NYSE turnover); the premium for dividend paying 
stocks; the closed-end fund discount; the number and first-day returns of IPOs; and the 
equity share in new issues. We collect the BW index data from January 1990 to 
December 2014, and for the whole 300-month sample period. If the month t’s BW 
sentiment index is higher (lower) than the median number of all the monthly BW 
sentiment index numbers, month t is defined as a high (low) investor sentiment month. 
The UM index is another sentiment index measured outside of the financial market and 
used widely in finance studies. The results are consistent with those using BW sentiment 
10 The BW sentiment data are available on Jeffrey Wurgler’s website http://people.stern.nyu.edu/jwurgler/. 
11  The UM sentiment data can be found on University of Michigan Surveys of Consumers website 
http://www.sca.isr.umich.edu/. 
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index. Furthermore, our findings are also supported by using four alternative sentiment 
measures: credit market sentiment index, FEARS index, VIX index, and NYSE based 
TRIN index, as reported in the robustness tests. 
3.2 Empirical methodology 
3.2.1 Fund management selectivity and alpha measures 
To examine whether the positive relationship between fund performance and 
management skill varies with time and particularly if it is more pronounced during high 
sentiment periods, we first employ the fund management selectivity measure of Amihud 
and Goyenko (2013), introduced in the active fund management literature, as a predictor 
of fund performance (alpha). Amihud and Goyenko (2013) have empirically shown their 
fund management selectivity measure to have significant explanatory power in predicting 
fund alpha, after controlling for other fund level characteristics. The Amihud and 
Goyenko (2013) fund selectivity measure is calculated using a fund’s R2 from regressing 
its returns on multifactor benchmark models. The main benchmark model used is the FFC 
model, which contains market excess return (RM-Rf), small minus big size stocks 
(SMB), high minus low book-to-market ratio stocks (HML), and winner minus loser 
stocks (MOM), and all the data are accessible online through the Kenneth French data 
library. According to Amihud and Goyenko (2013), a low R2 and indeed a low level of 
co-movement with the benchmark model applied, indicates fund management’s superior 
selectivity ability because highly skilled fund managers manage funds based on private 
information, which makes the fund less sensitive to variations in public information. 
Selectivity, in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), is measured as: 



















where RMSE2 is the variance of the error term from the regression, which denotes the 
idiosyncratic risk of a fund, Total Variance is the overall variance of a fund’s excess 
return, and Systematic Risk2 is the return variance that is due to the benchmark indexes’ 
risk. As Equation (1) demonstrates, selectivity is higher when the fund’s strategy is based 
more on firm-specific information, rather than market information. More importantly, 
unlike other fund selectivity measures, such as the well-known DGTW measure (DGTW, 
1997), which use the characteristics of stocks within each fund to estimate the fund 
manager selectivity skill, the Amihud and Goyenko (2013) method does not require the 
knowledge of fund holdings or the benchmark index that the fund is using. The fund 
performance measure we use in our analysis is the fund gross alpha, which is the average 
fund abnormal return before fees. The reason for using the fund gross alpha rather than 
the net alpha is that, as Berk and Green (2004) argue, if skill is detectable by investors, 
the significant positive net fund alpha will vanish due to the competition among 
investors. In that case, gross alpha is a more appropriate way to measure the fund 
managers' performance.12 
One may argue that by randomly selecting stocks, a manager can achieve an 
extremely low R2 without possessing any skill. However, Amihud and Goyenko (2013), 
in the same spirit of addressing a similar concern in the active share method of Cremers 
and Petajisto (2009), argue that actively managed funds by unskilled managers with low 
12 When we repeat the analysis using net alpha by subtracting expense ratio from gross alpha, we find similar results 
further validating the view that fund management skill is more valuable to investors when market sentiment is high. 
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R2 should be eliminated by the highly competitive market in the short run. To further 
ensure that low R2 funds in our sample represent the funds managed by skilled managers, 
we only use funds with data for more than two years. Our results confirm the validity of 
this methodology by showing a significant positive relation between fund selectivity (1-
R2) and fund performance.  
3.2.2 Value-added fund management skill and alpha measures 
As our second and more direct fund management skill measure, as claimed by 
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), we use their value-added measure. Specifically, the 
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) measure of fund management skill is obtained by 
estimating the value that a mutual fund extracts from capital markets. Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2015) document that investors recognize this skill and reward it by investing 
more capital with better funds. Their method allows to deduce fund management skill 
based on the extra value added to the fund (i.e., the mean of the product of the gross 
abnormal return and fund size at the beginning of the period) divided by its standard 
error, measured over the period December 2002 to December 2014. Mutual funds share 
the same investment mechanism, and a value measure, besides the return measure, is 
argued to be a direct and appropriate approach to measure fund performance. To measure 
fund performance, the gross abnormal return is adjusted by fund size. On the other hand, 
unlike prior studies that have measured fund performance using risk models (FFC model, 
Fama–French three-factor model, CAPM model, etc.), Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) 
evaluated fund performance by comparing fund performance with an alternative 
investment opportunity set – 11 Vanguard index funds, which they argue is the best 












alternative investment opportunity to investors.13,14 Their argument is that, in order to 
evaluate the performance of a mutual fund, one should compare its performance with the 
next best investment opportunity (benchmark) available to investors at that time. The 
benchmark (11 Vanguard index funds) should have two characteristics: the return of the 
benchmark should be known to investors and the benchmark can be traded. Therefore, 
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) suggest using the set of passively managed index funds 
offered by Vanguard as the alternative investment opportunity set, and they define the 
fund benchmark as the closet portfolio formed by those index funds. 
We then follow Berk and van Binsbergen (2015) and use the 11 Vanguard index 
funds to form the alternative investment opportunity set as the benchmark. 15  The 
benchmark is estimated by using data only when all the 11 index funds had available data, 
and finally, our data period covered 145 months, from December 2002 to December 2014. 
We then constructed an orthogonal basis set out of these index funds by regressing the nth 
fund on the orthogonal basis produced by the first n-1 funds over the whole 145-month 
period. The orthogonal basis for index fund n is calculated by adding the residuals 
collected from the prior regression and the mean return of the nth index fund of the whole 
period. 
13 The list of the 11 Vanguard index funds and their inception dates are shown in the Internet Appendix 2. 
14 To further validate the argument that skilled fund managers deliver higher performance for fund investors during 
high sentiment periods, we estimate the alphas of all 11 Vanguard index funds for all/high sentiment/low sentiment 
periods using FF3 model. The result, reported in the Internet Appendix 2, indicate that the effect of market sentiment to 
passive index funds is negligible and insignificant. 
15 Unlike their analysis, which focuses on the cross-sectional skill difference within fund managers, we use a rolling 
window regression method to test whether management skills vary with time. 
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Next, as shown below in Equation (2), we regress the excess returns of each fund 
f (i.e., the difference between the real fund returns over the corresponding risk-free rates 
in the same month), on the 11 Vanguard index fund orthogonal bases, using 24-month 
rolling window regression and moving forward 1 month each time, to estimate the 
correlation coefficients (βjt-1) between each orthogonal base (j) and fund return before the 
test month (t).  
𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑓,𝑡−1 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡−1
𝑗 𝑅𝑡−1
𝑗 + 𝛼𝑓,𝑡−111𝑗=1  (2) 
Then, as displayed in Equation (3), we use the estimated correlation coefficients, 
calculated during the 24-month time window (t-24 to t-1) before the test month (t), and 
the real numbers of all 11 orthogonal bases in test month (t) to estimate the expected 
excess return of fund f in month (t). The fund expected excess return is the product of 
multiplying the coefficients between each Vanguard index fund orthogonal basis and 
fund excess return from the 24-month preceding estimation period by the real numbers of 
each Vanguard index fund orthogonal basis in the current month. 
𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑓,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛽𝑡−1
𝑗 𝑅𝑡
𝑗 + 𝛼𝑓,𝑡11𝑗=1  (3) 
Following Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), the fund performance measure we 
use, as shown in Equation (4), is the abnormal capital inflow a fund experiences in the 
test month (denoted as the value-added alpha), which is calculated as the fund's gross 
abnormal return (real excess return over its expected excess return) multiplied by the 
TNA of the fund at the beginning of the current month. The added-value fund excess 
performance is estimated as follows: 












𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑓,𝑡 =
�𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑓,𝑡 − 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑓,𝑡� ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡 (4) 
To gauge fund management skill, we use the skill ratio measure introduced by 
Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), referred to as the value-added fund skill. As shown in 
Equation (5), the value-added fund management skill for each fund in each month is the 
product of a fund's abnormal returns (fund alpha) times the fund’s size at the beginning of 
the month before the test month, divided by the standard error of the fund alpha.16 The 
fund management skill is calculated as follows: 




Fund alphas and standard errors are obtained from the 24-month rolling window 
regression of fund excess return over the alternative investment opportunity. Fund size is 
the inflation-adjusted of total net assets of the fund. 
It is worth to emphasize here that the value-added fund management skill of Berk 
and van Binsbergen (2015) is not just a normalized version of the value-added alpha. The 
value-added fund management skill is the abnormal capital inflow one month before the 
test month (t-1) adjusted by the standard error of the fund alpha within the 24-month 
estimation window, while the value-added alpha captures the abnormal capital inflow 
(fund’s gain) during the test month (t). The fund performance and fund management skill 
measures used in this study, are in line with the Berk and van Binsbergen (2015). 
16 Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), specifically claim that “Value added, the product of assets under management 
(AUM) and gross alpha, always measures skill”.  
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3.2.3 Stock return dispersion and business cycle measures 
The previous literature has shown that the presence of dispersion in stock returns 
and the state of the economy can influence the market environment which, in turn, 
provides the opportunity of skilled fund managers to outperform the market (Von 
Reibnitz, 2015; and Kacperczyk et al., 2009, 2016). Active opportunity in the market, 
captured by cross-sectional dispersion in stock returns, as argued by Von Reibnitz (2015), 
could influence fund performance by the variation in the arrival of firm-specific 
information. During a high market-dispersion period, the market price is affected more by 
firm-specific information than market conditions. If so, during high market-dispersion 
times, the impact of active bets is expected to be more pronounced, and managers with 
skill in identifying, interpreting, and acting on firm-specific information will significantly 
outperform their low-skilled peers. As in Von Reibnitz (2015), we calculate market 





∑ (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑚,𝑡)2𝑛𝑖=1  (6) 
where n is the number of S&P 500 constituents in month t, Ri,t is the return of each 
constituent i in this month, and Rm,t is the equally weighted average return of all S&P 500 
constituents in month t. We collected the list of S&P 500 constituents and their monthly 
returns from Bloomberg database. Bloomberg reports these historical data since February 
1990, so our dataset for market dispersion ranges from February 1990 to December 2014.  












The second element that can have an impact on the profitability of skilled fund 
managers is the state of the economy. Kacperczyk et al. (2016) built an information 
choice model by assuming fund managers have a finite mental capacity (attention) and 
skilled managers are the ones who allocate their capacity efficiently. Since the optimal 
allocation strategy is changing with the state of the economy, the efficiency of fund 
managers’ investment strategy and fund return is expected to vary with time. Kacperczyk 
et al. (2009) decomposed manager skill into stock picking and market timing and report 
that managers balance those two strategies based on the state of the business cycle. The 
previous literature has also suggested that skilled managers devote more time and 
resources in managing a fund actively during recessions to protect the fund’s 
performance from economic downturns (Moskowitz, 2000; Glode, 2011; Kosowski, 
2011; and Von Reibnitz, 2015). Thus, one can argue that the effect of investor sentiment 
on mutual fund performance is caused by the correlation between the cyclical variation in 
sentiment and economic cycles. For that reason, we use the Chicago Fed National 
Activity Index 3 month average (CFNAI MA3), following Kacperczyk et al. (2009), to 
capture the effects of the business cycle on fund performance. 17  The CFNAI is a 
coincident indicator of national economic activity comprising 85 existing macroeconomic 
time series. 
17 Most studies use NBER business-cycle dates to clarify economic recessions or expansions. However, when we 
collected the data for this paper, NBER business cycle dates were unavailable after 2009. In addition, based on the 
NBER business-cycle dates, 200 months out of 234 sample months (1990–2009) were in expansions periods. 
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3.2.4 Lucky bias measurement  
Even though we employ two different measures to proxy fund manager skill to 
ensure that our results are not sensitive to a specific measure, it is reasonable to argue that 
fund performance may be due to luck rather than skill. To disentangle luck from skill, we 
used the “false discovery rate” approach developed by Barras et al. (2010) to estimate the 
fraction of mutual funds that truly outperform the benchmarks. This approach assumes 
that there are three mutual fund performance categories in the market: zero-alpha funds 
(performance is not different from 0), skilled funds (performance is significantly better 
than the benchmark), and unskilled funds (performance is significantly worse than the 
benchmark). The fund performances within each category are normally distributed. For a 
given significant level γ, the lucky (unlucky) funds within the skilled funds category and 
unskilled funds category are the same, and are calculated as: 
Fγ=π0 * γ/2 (7) 
where π0 is the true proposition of the zero-alpha fund category, and γ is the significance 
level we choose. Then, the true proportions of skilled funds, Tγ+, and unskilled funds, Tγ-, 
adjusted by the presence of lucky funds, Fγ, are measured as: 
Tγ+ = Sγ+ - Fγ = Sγ+ - π0 * γ/2 (8) 
Tγ- = Sγ- - Fγ = Sγ- - π0 * γ/2 (9) 
Next, we implement the procedure of Barras et al. (2010) with a rolling window 
regression analysis. A fund will be considered only if the fund has full data during the 
whole 24-month estimation period. Within each month, we count the total number of 












funds and P-value from each regression. Then, the true proposition of the zero-alpha fund 







where λ* is a sufficiently high P-value threshold (we use λ* = 0.6, as suggested in Barras 
et al., 2010). Wλ* equals the number of funds with a P-value exceeding λ* within this 
month, and Mt is the total number of funds considered in this month. 
4. Empirical Results 
4.1 Fund management selectivity performance results 
We begin our examination of whether the performance of active mutual funds of 
differing management skills is sensitive to investor sentiment by predicting fund 
performance based on the fund’s lagged 1-R2 and the lagged excess return from the 
multifactor model, i.e., the fund alpha. We estimate R2 using rolling regressions of the 
FFC model with a 24-month window. R2 is used only if the fund has 24 months’ 
continuous data. After each fund’s R2 is calculated for each month, we rank all the funds 
within each month based on their prior month’s selectivity (1-R2t-1) and sort all the funds 
into five quintiles based on their selectivity ranking. Within each quintile, we sort funds 
into five portfolios based on their prior one month’s performance (alphat-1), which is the 
intercept of the rolling regressions. This procedure produces 25 (5x5) portfolios with 
different selectivity and fund alphas, and each portfolio contains 4% of total mutual funds 
within the same month. 












For each month, we calculate the monthly average excess raw returns (over the T-
bill rate) of the funds that are included in each portfolio sorted by selectivity (1-R2t-1) and 
then past performance (alphat-1), and these average excess returns are regressed on the 
FFC model over the whole 25 years (1990–2014, 300 months) to obtain the abnormal 
risk-adjusted excess return, i.e., the portfolio fund alpha. The annualized alpha and P-
value for each portfolio are reported in Panel A of Table 2. Next, we examine whether 
fund selectivity skill varies with time and specifically whether high fund-management 
selectivity is associated with higher (lower) fund performance during high (low) states of 
sentiment. We address this question by examining whether variations in fund 
performance can be explained by variations in sentiment in line with the underlying 
hypothesis of this paper predicting that fund managers endowed with high selectivity skill 
should be associated with higher risk-adjusted excess returns during high investor 
sentiment periods. We used the BW sentiment index to measure the investor sentiment 
and separate our sample into high/low sentiment subgroups based on investor sentiment, 
and each subgroup contains 150 months’ observations. Then we repeat the previous 
analysis for high and low sentiment periods by sorting funds in each month by fund 
selectivity and past performance and present in Table 2 the annualized alpha and P-value 
for each portfolio for high (Panel B) and low (Panel C) sentiment periods. 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
Consistent with the findings of Amihud and Goyenko (2013), the results in Panel 
A of Table 2 show that greater fund selectivity, measured by (1-R2t-1), and superior past 
performance, measured by alphat-1, yields higher fund alpha. The results in the row “All” 
clearly show that fund portfolio performance (alpha) decreases as we move from the high 












selectivity (high 1-R2t-1) portfolio to the low selectivity (low 1-R2t-1) portfolio. This 
pattern also indicates that funds in the highest selectivity (lowest R2) portfolios are not 
outliers and that they are not driven by outlier funds with extreme low R2. The highest 
annualized alpha is 3.05% (P = 0.023) for the fund portfolio with the highest selectivity 
and the best past performance. Since the 25 (5x5) portfolios, sorted by fund selectivity 
and past performance, are equally weighted, each portfolio contains 4% of total active 
managed mutual funds in our sample. Thus, the significant positive alphas from those 
two portfolios formed by funds with the best past performance and highest or second 
highest fund selectivity indicate that, on average, around 8% of mutual funds outperform 
the benchmark significantly every month, which confirms that a relatively small fraction 
of active funds has selectivity skill that creates value for mutual fund investors. In sum, 
the results in Panel A of Table 2 reveal that funds’ risk-adjusted excess return is higher 
for funds with greater fund selectivity skill (1-R2t-1), which is highly consistent with the 
patterns in Amihud and Goyenko (2013). Besides, the results highlight the essential role 
of past performance in identifying skilled mutual fund managers. For instance, all funds 
in the top selectivity quintile, without controlling for fund past performance, exhibit an 
average insignificant fund alpha of 0.58% (P=0.426), while all funds in the top past 
performance quintile, without controlling for fund selectivity, report a similar 
insignificant fund alpha of 0.58% (P=0.381). However, funds with the highest selectivity 
and best past performance yield a significant fund alpha (3.05%, P=0.023). Therefore, in 
this paper we define skilled-managed funds as the ones run by managers possessing high 
selectivity or value-added skill that have exhibited superior past performance. 












We also calculate the performance difference between the high selectivity fund 
portfolio and the low selectivity fund portfolio by estimating a hypothetical portfolio of a 
long position in the high selectivity fund portfolio and a short position in the low 
selectivity fund portfolio for every lagged alpha quintile. These results, presented in the 
rightmost column of Table 2 under “High-Low,” indicate that the return from this 
strategy is positive in all alpha quintiles except the lowest alpha quintile, which is 
negative but statistically insignificant. For the whole sample, the high selectivity fund 
portfolio outperforms the low selectivity fund portfolio by 1.92% (P = 0.019). For the 
highest and second-highest alpha quintiles, the hypothetical portfolios yield an 
annualized alpha of 4.46% (P = 0.003) and 1.17% (P = 0.037), respectively. In sum, the 
results in Panel A of Table 2 reveal that funds’ risk-adjusted excess return is higher for 
funds with greater fund selectivity skill (1-R2t-1), which is highly consistent with the 
patterns in Amihud and Goyenko (2013).  
As predicted, the results in Panels B and C of Table 2 demonstrate that high 
selectivity fund managers with superior past performance consistently outperform their 
low selectivity counterparts. In accord with our conjecture, this performance difference is 
significantly pronounced during high sentiment (noisy) periods. Specifically, when the 
level of investor sentiment is high, as shown in Panel B, the highest past alpha quintile 
managers with the highest skill and second-highest skill produce 4.82% (P = 0.020) and 
2.70% (P = 0.073) higher excess returns than the market benchmark, respectively. In 
sum, about 8% of active funds outperform the market benchmark during high sentiment 
periods. The hypothetical strategy of a long position in the high selectivity fund portfolio 
and a short position in the low selectivity fund portfolio, rightmost “High-Low”, yields 












2.53% (P = 0.046) extra risk-adjusted return than the market. However, the results in 
Panel C indicate that during low sentiment periods none of the fund portfolios beat the 
market benchmark significantly. Interestingly, funds with the lowest skill experience the 
lowest -1.14% (P = 0.035) excess returns than the market benchmark while none of the 
funds with the highest management skill realize significant losses suggesting that in times 
of low sentiment their performance is at par with the market. In addition, the hypothetical 
strategy fails to significantly outperform the market on average. These results indicate the 
superior performance of fund managers with the highest and the second highest 
selectivity skill, reported in Panel A for the entire sample period, is realized during high 
sentiment periods. Taken together, the results are in line with our hypothesis that high 
fund management selectivity produces the highest alpha mainly during high sentiment 
periods. Funds with higher selectivity skill deliver higher risk-adjusted returns in high 
sentiment periods. During low sentiment periods, they fail to outperform the market when 
asset prices are commonly believed to trade near their intrinsic values (i.e. low 
mispricing) due to the absence of noise traders.18 Additionally, the hypothetical portfolios 
of long positions in the high past performance funds and short position in the low past 
performance funds show consistent positive alphas, indicating that funds with high past 
performance outperform funds with low past performance during both high and low 
sentiment states. However, this result is mainly driven by the superior performance of 
high skilled funds. A similar pattern does not hold for funds with low management skill. 
Jointly, these results suggest that fund selectivity skill is far more valuable to mutual fund 
18 To check the sensitivity of these results, we replicated our analysis using the median number of the UM index to 
separate high/low sentiment periods, and the results are economically and statistically more significant, shown in the 
Internet Appendix 3. 
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investors in high sentiment times when price signals are noisy due to the greater presence 
of investor hype in the market.19  
Since large company stocks are favored by institutional investors, we use high 
and low stock market capitalization as a proxy of a stock’s institutional ownership and 
expect noise trading activity to be more prevalent in stocks with lower institutional 
ownership especially during high sentiment times. Based on this argument, we perform 
additional tests to examine i) whether small-cap companies’ average performance is more 
negatively influenced by high market sentiment than large-cap companies and ii) whether 
small-cap focused funds (i.e., funds constrained by objective to invest in small 
capitalization stocks), compared with large-cap focused funds, lose more value for fund 
investors during high sentiment periods, when noise traders are more active and strongly 
affect the stock prices of small-cap companies. The results, reported in the Internet 
Appendix 4, are highly consistent with our hypothesis. 
4.2 Fund portfolio performance and stock market dispersion 
To examine whether fund management skill improves fund portfolio performance 
under equity market dispersion, we first repeat our portfolio sorting analysis simply based 
on the market dispersion. Similar to our sentiment analysis, we divide our sample into 
high and low market-dispersion periods based on the median number of the market-
dispersion index, calculated for January 1990 to December 2014. The reported results in 
Table 3 for the high (Panel A) and low (Panel B) market-dispersion periods indicate that 
19 Following Berk and van Binsbergen (2015), Dong and Doukas (2018) using the value-added fund skill measure they 
provide additional evidence in support of our fund-selectivity results.  
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fund managers with high selectivity skill outperform their unskilled peers and the market 
benchmark, especially during high market-dispersion periods. This pattern, which is 
consistent with our high sentiment results, suggests that skilled fund managers are also 
capable to add value to fund investor portfolios when the market is subject to 
considerable uncertainty and more difficult than normal times for fund investors to 
interpret financial price signals.  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
4.3 Fund portfolio performance and economic activity 
Using CFNAI MA3 to split the sample into recession and expansion periods, we 
repeated the portfolio sorting analysis using the same sample period as in the previous 
section (1990–2014). Our results, as shown in Table 4, reveal that more funds with high 
selectivity skill realize more positive risk-adjusted excess returns in economic expansions, 
which is 4.11% (P = 0.024), than in economic recessions, which is 3.54% (P = 0.055). 
These findings suggest that the ability of skilled fund managers to deliver high alpha 
during recessions imply that fund investors are better off when they invest with high 
selectivity funds during adverse economic conditions. These results are consistent with 
the previous literature (Kacperczyk et al., 2009) reporting that skilled active funds 
provide an insurance mechanism against recessions. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Jointly, these results—while in line with previous studies—also demonstrate that 
skilled fund managers realize superior performance during states of high equity market 












dispersion and economic expansion. However, one can argue that it is essentially market 
dispersion or business cycle, rather than market noise that determines the fund 
performance difference between the high and low sentiment states. In response to this 
argument, as shown later in Table 6, we account for the stock market dispersion and 
business cycle effects in our analysis and find that funds with skilled managers continue 
to have a significantly better performance during high investor sentiment periods. 
4.4 Fund management selectivity performance regression results 
So far, we have analyzed the positive relation between active fund performance, 
selectivity, and sentiment. To ensure that our evidence, which shows that high selectivity 
funds do outperform low selectivity funds, is not sensitive to the choice of the factor 
model we also consider the use of different factor models. To do so, we first form two 
fund portfolios based on selectivity as in Amihud and Goyenko (2013). In each month 
from January 1990 to December 2014, we formed five equally weighted fund portfolios 
based on their selectivity, which is estimated using rolling regressions of the FFC model 
with the 24-month time windows. These portfolios are rebalanced every month. Within 
these five portfolios, we only focus on the highest selectivity fund portfolio and the 
lowest selectivity fund portfolio. Within each month, we calculate the equally weighted 
average return for both portfolios and this provides a time series of monthly performance 
estimates for each portfolio. We then calculate the risk-adjusted returns of high and low 
selectivity fund portfolios using the CAPM model, FF3 model, and FFC model. The 
results are shown in Table 5, along with the performance of the hypothetical strategy of 
longing the high selectivity fund portfolio and shorting the low selectivity fund portfolio, 
in the column labeled "High-Low". 












[Insert Table 5 here] 
Unsurprisingly, the low-selectivity fund portfolio delivers significant negative 
fund alphas in all three models. On the other hand, the high-selectivity fund portfolio 
alpha is statistically insignificant in the FF3 and FFC models, which indicates that, on 
average, fund managers do not outperform these multifactor benchmarks. This is 
consistent with our earlier results demonstrating that only a small fraction of (skilled) 
fund managers (i.e., with the highest selectivity (Q5 quintile)), as shown in Table 2. The 
high selectivity fund portfolio outperforms its low selectivity counterpart significantly in 
all three models. The hypothetical strategy of a long position in the high selectivity fund 
portfolio and a short position in the low selectivity delivers 3.12% (P < 0.001), 2.16% (P 
= 0.004), and 1.92% (P = 0.031) annualized alphas in each of the three models, 
respectively.20 After adjusting for other risk factors, the spread in alpha between the high 
selectivity fund portfolio and the low selectivity fund portfolio decreases but continuous 
to remain significant. In addition, the significant negative relationship (-0.02, P < 0.001) 
between the return of the low selectivity portfolio and the momentum risk factor (MOM) 
indicates that low-skill managers require a lower return to invest in high-momentum-
related stocks, suggesting that low-skilled managers behave like the average investor who 
chases momentum market anomalies by paying high prices. This confirms that they lack 
analytic and investment selection skills. However, this is not the case for the skilled fund 
managers indicating that their superior performance is not driven by chasing momentum 
driven mispriced (overvalued) stocks in high sentiment times. The insignificant 
20 The annualized alpha is calculated as the monthly alpha (regression intercept) times 12 (i.e. 0.26*12=3.12%.; 
0.18*12=2.16; 0.16*12=1.92) 
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coefficient between skilled fund portfolio and MOM (0.02, P = 0.170) means that highly 
skilled fund managers do not appear to make a profit by capitalizing on the momentum 
anomaly per se. For the rest of our analysis, we will focus on the FFC model. 
Subsequently, we use multivariate regression analysis to examine the effect of 
selectivity and its interaction with sentiment on active fund performance for the entire 
sample period. The multivariate regression results are calculated using the BW index, as 
an investor sentiment measure,21 while we also control for the market dispersion and 
business cycle effects. 22  To test whether the profitability of fund management skill 
(selectivity) is higher during high sentiment periods, we estimate the following model: 
𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑓,𝑡 =
𝛼𝑓 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑓,𝑡−1 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑡 ∗
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑓,𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑓,𝑡−1 + ∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑓,𝑡  + 𝜀𝑓,𝑡 (11) 
where Alphaf,t is calculated as the difference in the fund’s excess return in each month 
(over the T-bill rate) and the expected excess return in the same month. The expected 
excess return for each fund in each month is calculated by multiplying the FFC model 
factor loadings from the 24-month preceding estimation period by the factors in the 
current month. The estimation and test periods are rolling one month at a time. Selectivity 
for each fund is calculated as 1-R2t-1, and R2 is estimated using the FFC model with the 
21 We also replicate the same analysis using an orthogonalized BW index where each of the proxies has first been 
orthogonalized with respect to a set of macroeconomic conditions. The results are similar to the reported ones and are 
available upon request. 
22 Among those variables, CFAI MA3 and the UM index have the strongest correlation coefficient of 0.565, followed 
by the correlation coefficient of -0.513 between CFAI MA3 and market dispersion. Our main sentiment measure, the 
BW index, has a -0.015 coefficient with CFAI MA3 and a 0.351 coefficient with market dispersion.  
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24-month estimation period. Alphat-1 is the intercept from the FFC model using a 24-
month estimation period. Control variables in the regression include expense ratio, log 
value of fund age, fund turnover, log of fund total net assets, and squared log value of the 
fund total net assets. Based on the central prediction of our hypothesis that active funds 
with superior past performance run by managers with high selectivity skills, they are 
expected to produce a better performance during high investor sentiment periods, when 
market signals are likely to be much noisier, than in low sentiment periods, we 
hypothesize that β1 > 0, β2 < 0, β3 > 0, β4 > 0, and β5 > 0. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Consistent with the results presented earlier and the above prediction, the results 
in Panel A of Table 6 show that selectivity in all regression specifications, in accordance 
with the evidence in Amihud and Goyenko (2013), is positive and significantly correlated 
with fund alpha (P < 0.001) while sentiment is negative and significantly related to fund 
alpha (P < 0.001), suggesting that, on average, fund performance is adversely affected 
when the market is plagued by noisy price signals as is most likely to be the case during 
high sentiment periods. However, the coefficient of the interaction variable between fund 
management selectivity and sentiment, Selectivity*Sentiment, is significant (0.172, P = 
0.032) and positively related to fund performance. Consistent with our hypothesis, this 
result demonstrates that during high sentiment periods, fund managers endowed with 
high selectivity deliver high alphas. This implies that high selectivity managers possess 
the ability to identify and make superior investments to the benefit of fund investors 
during high sentiment periods when the market is populated by noisy investors. The 
coefficient of the interactive variable, Selectivity*Sentiment*Alphat-1, is positive and 












significant in regressions [5] and [6], indicating that funds with skilled managers and high 
past performance deliver greater alpha in high market sentiment states.23 
Given that the distribution of R2 is negatively skewed with its mass being in the 
high values close to 1, the distribution of selectivity should be heavily positively skewed. 
Therefore, we replicated the previous estimation, using the logistic transformation of 
selectivity, labeled TSelectivity, as shown in Equation (12), instead of the original 
selectivity measure. 
𝑇𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦 = log ( 𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
1−𝑆𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑦
) (12) 
The new results, reported in Panel B of Table 6, have a similar pattern with those 
presented previously in Panel A. The logistic-transformed selectivity measure is 
positively correlated with fund alpha (P < 0.001). As in Panel A, Sentiment retains its 
negative relation with fund alpha and the coefficient of the interaction variable, 
TSelectivity*Sentiment, and fund performance is still positive and statistically significant 
(0.019, P=0.065). As before, the coefficients of the interactive variable 
TSelectivity*Sentiment*Alphat-1 are consistently positive and statistically significant. 
Jointly, the results in Table 6 demonstrate a positive and significant relationship between 
fund performance and fund management skill in high sentiment periods. A funds’ risk-
adjusted excess return is higher for funds run by high selectivity managers, as measured 
23 Our regression specifications are consistent with Amihud and Goyenko (2013). We also estimate regressions with fix 
effects and cluster-robust standard errors, and find similar results.  
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by 1-R2t-1, and show superior past performance, especially during high sentiment 
periods.24,25 
In sum, the consistency between the multivariate and the univariate results, 
regardless of fund selectivity and performance measures used, provide strong evidence in 
support of the proposition that skilled fund managers realize superior risk-adjusted 
abnormal returns in high sentiment periods when noisy trading is more prevalent, and it is 
more difficult to discern true (intrinsic) value by low skill fund managers. 
4.5 Lucky bias analysis 
4.5.1 Selectivity performance lucky bias results 
One criticism about the superior performance of skilled fund managers, 
particularly in high sentiment periods, as documented above, is that it could be attributed 
to luck rather than to the differing abilities of managers. To address this concern, we 
performed the Barras et al. (2010) a lucky bias analysis for the entire sample by 
replicating the analysis for both high and low sentiment periods. As shown in Panel A of 
Table 7, using fund risk-adjusted excess return (fund alpha) as a performance measure, 
24  Avramov and Wermers (2006) argue that some macroeconomic variables can affect fund managers skill and 
influence fund performance. To address the sensitivity of our results, we use four macroeconomic variables, as 
suggested in their paper, to control economic conditions: aggregate dividend yield, which is the total cash dividends on 
the value-weighted CRSP index over prior 12 months divided by the current level of the index; default spread, which is 
the difference between Moody’s BAA-rated bonds yield and AAA-rated bonds yield; term spread, which is the 
different between ten-year treasury bonds yield and three-month T-bills yield; and the yield on the three-month T-bill. 
These results, as shown in the Internet Appendix 5, are consistent with our previously reported findings. We also 
estimate regressions with fix effects and cluster-robust standard errors and find similar results. 
25 Using the value-added fund skill (ratio) and performance (alpha) measures, Dong and Doukas (2018) offer additional 
support to this result by showing that, on average, sentiment harms the overall fund performance, but this does not hold 
for skilled fund managers. 
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with a 20% significance level, 4.41% of the total funds beat the market significantly, and 
within the 4.41% funds, only 1.63% of fund managers are truly skilled. This number 
decreases to 0.69% when we move to the 5% significance level indicating that some of 
the mutual fund managers do possess management skill, but the proportion is very low. 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
After we take investor sentiment into consideration, the results for high (Panel B) 
and low (Panel C) investor sentiment are consistent with our hypothesis. On average, 
5.10% of funds outperform the market benchmark with a 20% significance level during 
high sentiment periods. After we get rid of the lucky funds, this number decreases to 
1.57%. Using a 5% significance level, the total proportion of funds with positive extra 
returns is 1.85%, and the skilled funds account for 1.00% of total funds. The portion of 
truly skilled mutual fund managers increases to 1.57% when we move the significance 
level from 5% to 20%. During low sentiment periods, 3.70% (1.13%) of total funds beat 
the market at the 20% (5%) significance level, and the true skilled-funds proportion is 
only 0.73% (0.39%). The result indicates that during high than low sentiment periods, 
when the market is noisy, and information is costly, skilled fund managers consistently 
outperform the market benchmark.  
4.5.2 Value-added fund performance lucky bias results 
When we replicate the lucky bias analysis using the value-added fund alpha as the 
performance measure, which captures the extra capital funds absorb from the financial 
market, we find similar results to those reported in Table 7. Specifically, as shown in 
Table 8 Panel A, on average, 7.52% of funds outperform the market benchmark at the 












20% significance level. The proportion drops to 5.40% (1.48%) at a 20% (5%) 
significance level after we remove the lucky funds. Once again, during high sentiment 
periods, the percentage of skilled funds goes up to 8.60% (2.71%), but in low sentiment 
periods, the percentage decreases to 2.24% (0.27%). 
[Insert Table 8 here]  
There are three points to take away from the lucky bias analysis. First, even 
though the average mutual manager cannot beat the market, a small fraction of fund 
managers (about 1.63%, using selectivity (1-R2) measure, and 5.40%, using value-added 
skill measure, which both are below the 20% significance level) with high stock-picking 
skills delivers persistently superior performance than their low skill peers. Second, skilled 
fund managers’ skills are more profitable during high sentiment periods when the market 
is crowded with noise traders. During low sentiment periods when stocks are more likely 
to be traded near their intrinsic values, only a smaller portion of skilled managers 
produces significantly positive fund alphas for investors, which implies that selectivity 
skill is less valuable in low sentiment periods. Third, as argued by Berk and van 
Binsbergen (2015), there are more skilled fund managers in the market than we can 
detect using fund excess returns to capture performance because larger skilled funds may 
generate more value for their clients with relative low alphas. One could argue that an 
upward bias exists in the results due to sample selection, since good opportunities might 
attract more talented managers into the mutual fund industry during high sentiment 
periods. Conversely, there might be a downward bias if bad funds disappear in times of 
low sentiment. To address this concern, we estimate the correlation between the number 
of funds appearing/disappearing and investor sentiment (BW Index) for each month. 












Interestingly, we find the number of new funds appearing to be insignificantly correlated 
with investor sentiment index (-0.01, P=0.880), implying that skilled fund managers are 
not attracted by high investor sentiment. However, the number of funds disappearing is 
significantly positively correlated with investor sentiment (0.22, P< .001), demonstrating 
that investor sentiment harms their performance due to lack of skill.26 
4.6 Stock mispricing and mutual fund performance 
Next, one can argue that the superior performance of high selectivity fund 
managers during high sentiment periods is driven by investing in “bubble-prone” stocks 
(i.e., overpriced stocks). The opposite view, however, holds that high selectivity fund 
managers are not expected to improve fund performance by opportunistically investing in 
overpriced stocks during high sentiment times. To address this issue, we examine 
whether the superior performance of skilled fund managers in high sentiment periods, 
when the views of optimistic (noisy) investors are more pronounced and short selling is 
limited, comes through investing in overvalued (bubble-prone) stocks. That is, we 
perform a cross-sectional analysis on the relation between fund performance and stock 
mispricing, using a set of 11 market anomalies to identify overpriced stocks (Stambaugh 
et al., 2012).27,28 Specifically, the stock mispricing data range between 0 and 100, and 
stocks with the highest mispricing values are the ones that are overpriced by the market, 
while stocks with the lowest mispricing values are underpriced. Since stocks with the 
26 These results are available upon request.  
27 The 11 anomalies contain net stock issues, composite equity issues, accruals, net operating assets, asset growth, 
investment to assets, financial distress, O-score, momentum, gross profitability premium, and return on assets. 
28 The data are available through Yu Yuan’s website http://www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/. 
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highest mispricing values are identified as overpriced by the market due to high market 
sentiment, they should be less attractive to skilled fund managers. Thus, we expect to 
observe a less significant or insignificant relationship between skilled fund managers’ 
performance and highly mispriced (overpriced) stocks, while our hypothesis predicts a 
significant negative correlation between the performance of funds managed by less 
skilled managers and overpriced stocks. Then, we calculate the value weighted average of 
stock mispricing (VW_MISP) for all stocks within each fund.29 To check the sensitivity of 
our results, we replace the value weighted average mispricing with the equal weighted 
average of stock mispricing (EW_MISP) for all stocks within each fund. Next, we break 
our sample into 5 quintiles based on fund management skill and estimate the relation 
between fund performance and stock mispricing for each quintile.  
[Insert Table 9 here] 
Table 9 presents the regression coefficients between fund performance and stock 
mispricing by regressing fund performance, for the 5 management skill quintiles, on fund 
level mispricing, while controlling for past fund performance (Alphat-1), expense ratio, 
log value of fund age, fund turnover, log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log 
value of TNA. First, as expected, the results in column “All” reveal a significant and 
negative relation between fund performance and stock mispricing. Furthermore, we find 
that the negative association between fund performance and stock mispricing is more 
pronounced for funds with lower management skill, indicating that overvalued stocks are 
more attractive to unskilled fund managers. For example, when sorting funds based on 
29 Fund holdings information is manually collected through Bloomberg Portfolio Analysis Database. 
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fund selectivity, the coefficient between fund performance and VW_MISP (EW_MISP) in 
the lowest skill fund quintile is -0.111 (-0.111) and significant, while the coefficient in 
the highest skill fund quintile is -0.069 (-0.101). This pattern is even stronger when 
sorting funds into quintiles using the value-added fund skill measure. In sum, consistent 
with our previous evidence, the results of this cross-sectional analysis demonstrate that 
skilled fund managers’ investments are associated with undervalued stocks, rather than 
overvalued (“bubble-prone”) ones. 
4.7 Fund capital inflows and fund performance analysis  
The portfolio sorting and multivariate analysis, thus far, show that skilled fund 
managers have a significant and persistent past performance (alphat-1), and this should 
attract capital inflows from the financial market as investors tend to make investment 
decisions based on the past performance of mutual funds. Therefore, due to limited 
optimal investment opportunities in the market skilled fund managers under the pressure 
to invest the extra capital inflows will be forced to make investment decisions which 
consequently may weaken fund performance (fund alpha), unless they are endowed with 
high selectivity skills. Additionally, studies have shown that sentiment is correlated with 
fund flows (Ben-Raphel, Kandel, and Wohl, 2012). In this section, we address these 
issues by investigating whether the funds with skilled managers and superior past 
performance attract more capital inflows and whether the superior performance of skilled 
fund managers remains pronounced under the influence of additional capital inflows. 
To inspect the influence of capital inflows, we first estimate the capital flow of 
each fund as follows: 












𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡 − (1 + 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) ∗ 𝑇𝑁𝐴𝑓,𝑡−1 (13) 
where TNAf,t is the total net assets of fund f in month t, and Rf,t is the fund return in month 
t. To test whether and how fund performance is affected by capital flows, we include net 
capital flows 2 months ago (Fowt-2) and 1 month ago (Flowt-1), and their interaction 
variables with fund selectivity and sentiment into our main multivariate regression, as 
presented in Equation (10). 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
Consistent with our prediction, the results in Table 10 column [1] show a negative 
and significant relation between the previous month capital inflows (Flowt-1) and fund 
alpha, which suggests that extra capital inflows create more pressure on fund managers to 
invest resulting in lower fund alpha. The insignificant impact of the interaction variables 
Flow*Sentiment in t-1 and t-2 (P = 0.990 and P = 0.596, respectively) on fund alpha, as 
shown in column [2], indicate that the negative relation between the previous months’ 
capital inflows and fund performance is not sentiment-related. The coefficients of the 
interaction Flow*Selectivity in t-1 and t-2, as reported in column [3], are positive and 
significant (P = 0.000), suggesting that managers with high selectivity skill deliver higher 
alpha than their unskilled fund counterparts implying that they direct the extra capital 
inflows in better investment opportunities. The result in column [4] further confirms that 
past performance matters fund alpha. Last, the positive and significant coefficients of the 
interaction variables, Flowt-1*Selectivity*Alphat-1 and Flowt-2*Selectivity*Alphat-1 yield 
direct support that fund investors are better off by investing in funds with superior 
managerial skill and with high past performance. Overall, these results demonstrate that 












managers with high selectivity skill generate higher alpha by investing increased capital 
inflows, as a result of their past performance, to superior investment opportunities. 
5. Robustness 
5.1 Sentiment beta analysis 
Several studies have focused on the profitability of mutual funds’ sentiment 
timing strategy. For example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) and Carhart (1997) 
have showed that mutual funds tend to follow momentum. Recently, Massa and Yadav 
(2015) reported that mutual funds employ portfolio strategies based on market sentiment. 
Specifically, they find that low sentiment beta funds outperform the high sentiment beta 
funds, even after controlling for standard risk factors and fund characteristics. This result 
is attributed to the sentiment-contrarian strategy rather than the sentiment-momentum 
strategy, which, in turn, attracts significant investor capital flows in comparison to the 
sentiment-catering strategy. In a more recent study, Chen, Han, and Pan (2016) examine 
whether exposure to sentiment risk can explain the cross-sectional variation in hedge 
fund returns and find that funds with a sentiment beta in the top decile subsequently 
outperform those in the bottom decile by 0.67% per month on a risk-adjusted basis. 
Therefore, they argue that some hedge funds can time sentiment and contribute to fund 
performance by increasing their exposure to a sentiment factor when the factor premium 
is high. 
In this section, we investigate the impact of fund sentiment timing strategy on 
fund performance. As discussed earlier, in this study, we view investor sentiment as an 
economic condition, rather than as a risk factor to be exploited by its timing and argue 












that skilled managers invest in assets based on their superior analytic ability and private 
information about an asset’s true value, rather than timing investor sentiment. This leads 
us to expect that the fund sentiment timing strategy is more likely to be associated with 
low rather than high skilled fund managers. To examine whether high (low) skilled fund 
managers are less (more) likely to time investor sentiment, we perform Fama–MacBeth 
regressions of high- and low-skilled fund portfolio returns and alphas on sentiment beta, 
while controlling for fund-level characteristics. The fund alpha is calculated as the 
intercept of the regressing portfolio excess returns on the FFC model for our entire 300-
months sample period. Following Massa and Yadav (2015), we calculate each portfolio’s 
sentiment beta by regression using the 24 months of data proceeding the current month: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝑅𝑀 − 𝑅𝑓)𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑡+𝛽5𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡  (14) 
where Rp,t is the portfolio p’s return in month t; Rf,t is the risk-free rate in month t; RM-Rf 
is the market excess return in month i, SMB is the return difference of small and big size 
stocks in month i, HML is the return difference of high and low book-to-market ratio 
stocks in month i, MOM is the return difference of winner and loser stocks in month i, 
and Sentiment is the BW index for the same month. β5 is the sentiment beta estimated by 
running regression (14) with a 24-month moving window. Then, we run the following 
cross-sectional regression of portfolio return (15) (and portfolio alpha obtained from FFC 
model (16)) on the sentiment beta, with or without fund-level control variables: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝜑∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑡 (15) 
𝑎𝑙𝑝ℎ𝑎𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝜔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝐵𝑒𝑡𝑎𝑡−1 + 𝜑∑𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑡 + 𝜖𝑝,𝑡 (16) 












The control variables include the equally weighted average expense ratio, fund 
age, turnover, and log value of fund TNA. 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
Table 11 reports the Fama–MacBeth regression results where the dependent 
variable is either the monthly portfolio excess return or the portfolio alpha. The only 
significant coefficient on sentiment beta that emerges from these regressions is for the 
low-skill fund portfolio’s alpha, when alpha serves as a dependent variable, indicating 
that low-skilled funds seem to time investor sentiment by employing a sentiment-
momentum strategy. Other than that, the insignificant coefficient of sentiment beta in the 
high-skill regressions, suggests that skilled fund managers do not appear to time investor 
sentiment. These results support the view that skilled fund managers do not time investor 
sentiment as a value-creating strategy because, as argued by Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
movements in investor sentiment are in part unpredictable. Therefore, fund managers 
betting against mispricing during high sentiment periods run a high risk, at least in the 
short run, that investor sentiment will become more extreme and prices will move even 
further away from fundamental values. Skilled fund managers focus more on stock 
selection during high sentiment periods than on timing the investor sentiment movements. 
Consistent with our previous results, these findings imply that skilled fund managers’ 
superior performance relative to their low-skilled peers is mainly due to their ability to 
produce more (private) information about the true value of financial assets under 
management during high sentiment periods when asset prices are noisier than in low 
sentiment periods when financial markets are not crowded by unsophisticated (noisy) 
investors. 












5.2 Volatility anomaly analysis 
There is also evidence in the literature suggesting that the volatility anomaly, 
either directly or indirectly, can lead to mismeasurement of fund manager skill (Jordan 
and Riley, 2015; Novy-Marx, 2014; and Fama and French, 2017). Volatility anomaly 
basically means that the low volatility stock portfolio outperforms the high volatility 
stock portfolio significantly, and Jordan and Riley (2015) show that it has a large impact 
on mutual fund returns, which could create a significant bias when measuring managers' 
skills. Even though the volatility anomaly has been questioned by other studies, we test 
the sensitivity of our results by controlling for the effect of the volatility anomaly.30  
In accord with section 4.1, we sort all the funds in each month into 25 (5x5) 
portfolios with a different selectivity (1-R2t-1) and past fund performance, alphat-1. Next, 
we examine whether fund selectivity skill varies with time and particularly whether high 
selectivity is associated with a higher fund performance during high sentiment states. As 
before, we use the BW sentiment index to measure the investor sentiment and if the 
month t’s BW sentiment index is higher (lower) than the median number of all the 
monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define month t as a high (low) investor 
sentiment month. Then, for each month, we calculate the monthly average excess raw 
returns of funds included in each portfolio and regress the returns on the Fama–French 
five-factor plus momentum factor model, which contain the profitability factor and 
investment factor that can explain the volatility anomaly (Jordan and Riley, 2015), to 
30  For example, Moreira and Muir (2016) showed that a volatility-managed portfolio, which decreases portfolio 
volatility when the expected market risk is high and increases the portfolio volatility when expected market risk is low, 
yields high alphas and increases the portfolio Sharpe ratio significantly. 
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obtain the abnormal risk-adjusted excess return, i.e., portfolio fund alpha. Table 12 
presents the annualized fund alpha and P-value for each portfolio in high (Panel A) and 
low (Panel B) sentiment periods, respectively. 
[Insert Table 12 here]  
These results continue to show that skilled fund managers’ performance is 
superior during high investor sentiment periods indicating that they are not sensitive to 
the volatility anomaly. Consistent with the pattern of our main results, fund portfolio 
performance (alpha), as shown in row “All,” decreases from the high selectivity (high 1-
R2t-1) portfolio to the low selectivity (low 1-R2t-1) portfolio in both high (Panel A) and low 
sentiment (Panel B) periods. Panel A shows that when investor sentiment level is high, 
the highest past alpha quintile managers with the highest skill and second-highest skill 
produce 6.66% (P = 0.002) and 4.54% (P = 0.003) higher excess returns than the market 
benchmark, respectively. However, during low sentiment periods, as shown in Panel B, 
the fund portfolio with the highest selectivity and the best past performance cannot beat 
the market benchmark significantly (1.93%, P = 0.247). In addition, the hypothetical 
strategy fails to significantly outperform the market on average (0.64%, P = 0.167).31 
Taken together, these results provide supplemental evidence in support of our baseline 
hypothesis that skilled managers produce higher fund alphas during high sentiment 
periods, and this relationship is not biased by the volatility anomaly.  
31 The same analysis is re-examined using the UM index and the results are consistent with the results using the BW 
index. 
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5.3 Alternative sentiment measures 
We also ran robustness tests using several alternative sentiment measures: credit 
market sentiment, the FEARS sentiment index, the VIX index, and the NYSE based 
TRIN index. Following Lopez-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajsek (2016), we estimated the 
credit investor sentiment using the two-step econometric methodology. First, we calculate 
the spread between yields on seasoned long-term Baa-rated industrial bonds and yields on 
10-year Treasury securities for each month. Next, we regress the change in the spread 
based on the past 24 months’ spreads, and the expected spread change is used as the 
credit investor sentiment index. The 24-month estimation period moves one month each 
time. The FEARS index, as introduced by Da et al. (2015), is an index based on the 
internet search behavior of households. To use this index in our analysis, we converted 
the data into monthly observations by taking the average of the daily data in order to 
match our data. The VIX index is estimated based on a range of S&P 500 index options 
and reflects the expectation of the equity market volatility in the near future, which is 
often referred as fear index or the fear gauge. The TRIN index is a short-term technical 
analysis stock market trading indicator, which is widely used in the financial industry to 
indicate bullish (TRIN<1) and bearish (TRIN>1) market sentiment. Unreported results 
based on these alternative sentiment measures are qualitatively consistent with the pattern 
of our previous finding that skilled mutual fund managers generate greater value (alpha) 
during high equity market sentiment periods, identified by low credit market sentiment 
index, high FEARS index, low VIX index (i.e. market complacency), and low (bullish) 
TRIN index. 













In this paper, unlike most of the previous literature that has focused on the 
question of whether fund managers improve fund performance, we specifically examine 
whether skilled mutual fund managers deliver greater value (alpha) during high sentiment 
states, when security markets are crowded by noise traders (signals). Our results can be 
construed as providing general support for the hypothesis that skilled fund managers 
generate persistent excess risk-adjusted returns especially during high sentiment periods, 
when asset prices are noisier, and information is costlier.  
Using a large sample of U.S. domestic active managed equity mutual funds, we 
empirically test this conjecture and find that managers endowed with high fund 
management skills realize superior and persistent fund performance during high investor 
sentiment periods. Assessing the performance of fund managers in stock mispricing states, 
as an alternative set of noise trading activity, our evidence consistently shows that high-
skill (low-skill) managers’ performance is associated with undervalued (overvalued) 
stocks, indicating their ability to create value by identifying and carrying out profitable 
trades. Additionally, the findings of this study offer new evidence that mutual fund 
investors are significantly better off by allocating capital to funds characterized by 
superior managerial high and superior past performance.  
We also perform a lucky bias analysis and find that more fund managers with 
superior management skills can generate persistent excess risk-adjusted returns during 
high sentiment periods, which further supports the argument that fund skill is more 
profitable and valuable for fund investors in the presence of greater noise in the market. 












Our findings are robust to sentiment beta effect, stock market dispersion, macroeconomic 
environment, alternative sentiment measures, and the effect of the volatility anomaly. 
Overall, our findings conclusively show that skilled fund managers create more value and 
exhibit persistent performance during high than low sentiment periods, when noise 
trading activity is more pronounced. 
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Table 1. Summary Statistics of Actively Managed Equity Mutual Funds’ 
Characteristics 
This table shows descriptive statistics of individual fund estimates of R2t-1 and control variables before the 
removal of outlier observations as in Armihud and Goyenko (2013) for comparison purposes. R2 t-1 is 
calculated by regressing each fund’s excess return (fund monthly raw return minuses one-month T-bill rate 
of that month) on the multifactor model of Fama-French (1993) and Carhart (1997) (FFC model) over a 
time window of 24 months. Our sample contains 2190 actively-managed U.S. equity mutual funds over the 
period from January 1990 to December 2014, with 273,557 observations. Turnover is the minimum of 
aggregated sales or aggregated purchases of securities divided by the total net assets of the fund. Expense 
ratio is the annual expense ratio of each fund. TNA is each fund’s total net assets in millions. 
 
Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
Turnover (%) 85.64 56.00 0.00 3,452.00 
Age (years) 17.44 17.00 3.00 47.00 
Expense Ratio (%) 1.28 1.21 0.00 9.16 
TNA (millions) 1,267.96 234.49 8.26 202,305.77 
R2 t-1 0.883 0.922 0.219 0.991 
 












Table 2. Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Selectivity and Alphat-1, in High 
and Low Sentiment Periods 
This table presents the portfolio fund alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, from January 1990 to 
December 2014 (Panel A), high sentiment (Panel B), and low sentiment (Panel C) periods, based on the 
sentiment index data available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) 
is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this 
month as high (low) market sentiment month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into 
quintiles by lagged R2 and then by fund alphat-1. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-
24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC 
model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate the average monthly excess returns for each fund 
portfolio. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last, we 
regress the test period average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell, we present 
portfolio alpha, which is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes 
significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
Panel A: Portfolio fund alpha for the entire sample period 
  Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -1.75*** -2.04*** -1.84** -1.97** -2.06 -1.93*** -0.31 
 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.015) (0.026) (0.117) (0.002) (0.765) 
2 -1.43*** -0.99** -0.90 -0.34 0.34 -0.67 1.77** 
 
(0.001) (0.049) (0.154) (0.653) (0.712) (0.196) (0.047) 
3 -0.94** -0.67 -1.17** -0.51 0.56 -0.55 1.50 
 
(0.024) (0.143) (0.044) (0.450) (0.501) (0.219) (0.145) 
4 -1.18** -1.16 0.11 -0.20 0.99 -0.28 2.17** 
 
(0.011) (0.106) (0.840) (0.792) (0.277) (0.535) (0.037) 
High -1.41* -0.81 -0.08 2.14** 3.05** 0.58 4.46*** 
  (0.051) (0.355) (0.912) (0.025) (0.023) (0.381) (0.003) 
All -1.34*** -1.14** -0.78 -0.19 0.58 -0.57 1.92** 
 
(0.001) (0.012) (0.110) (0.754) (0.426) (0.166) (0.019) 
High-Low 0.34 1.23 1.76* 4.11*** 5.11** 2.51** 
 
  (0.606) (0.191) (0.061) (0.001) (0.004) (0.004)   
Panel B: Portfolio fund alpha during high market sentiment  
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -2.38*** -3.71*** -2.97** -2.68* -1.45 -2.65*** 0.93 











  (0.002) (0.001) (0.017) (0.054) (0.412) (0.006) (0.614) 2 -2.34*** -1.38* -2.11** -1.02 0.02 -1.36* 2.36* 
 
(0.001) (0.097) (0.026) (0.378) (0.990) (0.095) (0.068) 
3 -1.36** -1.40** -2.19** -0.69* 0.03 -1.12* 1.39 
 
(0.021) (0.050) (0.018) (0.508) (0.982) (0.095) (0.34) 
4 -0.95 -1.19 -0.73 -0.01 0.36 -0.50 1.31 
 
(0.187) (0.150) (0.381) (0.996) (0.792) (0.488) (0.396) 
High -1.92 -1.39 -0.50 2.70* 4.82** 0.75 6.74*** 
  (0.133) (0.379) (0.696) (0.073) (0.020) (0.499) (0.006) 
All -1.79*** -1.82** -1.70** -0.35 0.74 -0.98 2.53** 
 
(0.003) (0.014) (0.033) (0.721) (0.508) (0.147) (0.046) 
High-Low 0.46 2.32 2.47 5.38*** 6.27** 3.40** 
 
  (0.787) (0.209) (0.117) (0.009) (0.015) (0.017)   
Panel C: Portfolio fund alpha during low market sentiment 
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -1.14** -0.33 -0.90 -1.38 -2.35 -1.21 -1.21 
 
(0.035) (0.668) (0.272) (0.156) (0.236) (0.117) (0.470) 
2 -0.61 -0.68 -0.45 -0.36 0.44 -0.34 1.05 
 
(0.186) (0.161) (0.450) (0.670) (0.711) (0.540) (0.386) 
3 -0.54 -0.31 -0.84 -0.81 0.58 -0.38 1.12 
 
(0.280) (0.549) (0.136) (0.255) (0.595) (0.413) (0.449) 
4 -1.34** -1.34 0.27 -1.22 1.40 -0.44 2.74* 
 
(0.019) (0.253) (0.687) (0.117) (0.245) (0.410) (0.051) 
High -0.68 0.30 0.16 0.89 0.63 0.26 1.31 
  (0.328) (0.694) (0.859) (0.439) (0.702) (0.730) (0.458) 
All -0.86** -0.47 -0.34 -0.58 0.17 -0.42 1.03 
 
(0.026) (0.321) (0.457) (0.331) (0.851) (0.341) (0.312) 
High-Low 0.46 0.63 1.06 2.27* 2.98 1.47* 
 
  (0.312) (0.232) (0.208) (0.055) (0.196) (0.070)   












Table 3. Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Selectivity and Alphat-1, in High 
and Low Market Dispersion Periods 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market dispersion 
periods. If market dispersion index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all 
monthly market dispersion index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market dispersion month. 
Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R2 and then by fund alphat-
1. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly 
excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we 
calculate the average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. This process is repeated by moving 
the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last, we regress the test period average portfolio returns 
on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell we present portfolio alpha, which is the intercept from the above 
regression, and the P-value. The sample period of the test months is from February 1990 to December 2014 
(299 months). Panel A shows the results of high market dispersion group and Panel B shows the results of 
low market dispersion group. For each portfolio, we present the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly 
returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
Panel A: During high market dispersion 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -2.31*** -3.59*** -1.87 -1.92 -1.39 -2.22** 0.92 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.163) (0.201) (0.534) (0.040) (0.729) 
2 -2.00*** -1.39* -1.38 -0.16 1.46 -0.69 3.46** 
 
(0.004) (0.096) (0.196) (0.902) (0.341) (0.432) (0.017) 
3 -1.53** -1.31* -2.04** -0.83 -0.20 -1.18 1.33 
 
(0.026) (0.083) (0.037) (0.459) (0.889) (0.113) (0.452) 
4 -2.39*** -1.39 -0.21 0.01 1.02 -0.59 3.41** 
 
(0.002) (0.121) (0.822) (0.995) (0.497) (0.442) (0.045) 
High -1.98 -2.37 0.07 3.57** 4.55** 0.77 6.53*** 
 
(0.118) (0.139) (0.962) (0.031) (0.035) (0.509) (0.008) 
All -2.05*** -2.02*** -1.09 0.11 1.09 -0.79 3.14** 
 
(0.001) (0.009) (0.196) (0.913) (0.382) (0.272) (0.020) 
High-Low 0.33 1.22 1.94 5.49** 5.94* 2.99* 
 
 
(0.925) (0.498) (0.308) (0.015) (0.051) (0.062) 
 
Panel B: During low market dispersion  
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 











 Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low Low -1.39*** -0.68 -1.60*** -2.10*** -2.92** -1.74*** -1.53 
 
(0.008) (0.289) (0.006) (0.010) (0.034) (0.002) (0.278) 
2 -0.98** -0.67 -0.52 -0.35 -0.84 -0.68* 0.14 
 
(0.015) (0.130) (0.307) (0.615) (0.368) (0.095) (0.947) 
3 -0.48 -0.14 -0.18 -0.20 1.47* 0.10 1.95** 
 
(0.210) (0.750) (0.730) (0.744) (0.058) (0.784) (0.044) 
4 0.13 -0.82 0.57 -0.16 1.13 0.17 1.00 
 
(0.794) (0.475) (0.303) (0.814) (0.201) (0.694) (0.350) 
High -0.68 1.05 0.09 1.31 2.04 0.77 2.72 
 
(0.304) (0.119) (0.884) (0.136) (0.187) (0.191) (0.107) 
All -0.68* -0.25 -0.33 -0.31 0.18 -0.28 0.86 
 
(0.058) (0.547) (0.413) (0.518) (0.786) (0.399) (0.312) 
High-Low 0.71 1.73** 1.69*** 3.41*** 4.96** 2.51*** 
 
 







Table 4. Portfolio Fund Alpha, Based on Sorting on Selectivity and Alphat-1, in 
Economic Expansions and Economic Recessions 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in economic expansions and 
economic recessions. If the Fed National Activity Index 3-month average (CFNAI MA3) for the test month 
(t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly CFNAI MA3 index numbers, we define this 
month as economic expansion (recession) month. Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month 
into quintiles by lagged R2 and then by fund alpha. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period 
(t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC 
model. Then, for the following month (t), we calculate the average monthly excess returns for each fund 
portfolio. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. Last, we 
regress the test period average portfolio returns on the FFC model. For each portfolio cell, we present 
portfolio alphat-1, which is the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. The sample period of 
the test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). Panel A shows the results in 












economic expansions and Panel B shows the results in economic recessions. For each portfolio, we present 
the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at 
the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 
Panel A: Economic expansions 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -1.52** -3.27*** -2.55** -4.09*** -3.12* -2.92*** -1.60 
 
(0.028) (0.001) (0.029) (0.003) (0.084) (0.002) (0.327) 
2 -1.75*** -0.67 -2.65*** -1.00 -0.97 -1.41** 0.78 
 
(0.006) (0.381) (0.003) (0.298) (0.401) (0.043) (0.532) 
3 -1.07* -0.95 -1.25 -1.14 -0.02 -0.89 1.05 
 
(0.075) (0.122) (0.142) (0.203) (0.983) (0.122) (0.334) 
4 -0.46 -1.83 -0.17 -0.57 1.48 -0.31 1.94 
 
(0.459) (0.146) (0.810) (0.609) (0.176) (0.610) (0.123) 
High -0.75 -0.13 0.95 3.69*** 4.11** 1.58** 4.86** 
 
(0.422) (0.892) (0.268) (0.006) (0.024) (0.041) (0.021) 
All -1.12** -1.38** -1.14* -0.65 0.27 -0.81 1.39 
 
(0.032) (0.028) (0.086) (0.439) (0.760) (0.152) (0.176) 
High-Low 0.77 3.14** 3.50*** 7.78*** 7.23*** 4.50*** 
 
 
(0.478) (0.012) (0.003) (<.001) (0.003) (<.001) 
 
Panel B: Economic recessions 
   
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All High-Low 
Low -1.89*** -1.04 -0.68 -0.30 -0.62 -0.90 1.27 
 
(0.003) (0.224) (0.464) (0.778) (0.738) (0.252) (0.512) 
2 -1.06** -1.19* 0.73 0.65 1.99 0.22 3.05** 
 
(0.042) (0.072) (0.394) (0.554) (0.161) (0.767) (0.019) 
3 -0.84 -0.06 -0.66 0.20 1.37 0.01 2.21 











  (0.127) (0.916) (0.393) (0.835) (0.325) (0.987) (0.195) 4 -1.87*** -0.38 0.63 0.45 0.99 -0.02 2.86* 
 
(0.006) (0.610) (0.462) (0.661) (0.497) (0.972) (0.077) 
High -1.79* -1.34 -0.62 1.61 3.54* 0.27 5.33*** 
 
(0.075) (0.313) (0.606) (0.220) (0.055) (0.786) (0.008) 
All -1.49*** -0.80 -0.12 0.51 1.48 -0.08 2.97** 
 
(0.003) (0.175) (0.866) (0.549) (0.193) (0.891) (0.013) 
High-Low 0.10 -0.30 0.06 1.91 4.16* 1.17 
 
 
(0.914) (0.789) (0.982) (0.185) (0.094) (0.301) 
 
 
Table 5. Regressions of Returns of Fund Portfolios on CAPM, FF3, and FFC Models 
This table reports the regression results for monthly returns on portfolios with high or low skilled funds 
from January 1990 through December 2014 (300 months) based on CAPM model, FF3 model, and FFC 
model. The high (low) skilled fund portfolio is an equal weighted portfolio of active US equity funds with 
the highest (lowest) 20% selectivity (1-R2t-1), where R2t-1 is obtained from the 24-month estimation period 
(t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC 
model. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. The 
independent variables contain market excess return (RM-Rf), return difference of small and big size stocks 
(SMB), return difference of high and low book-to-market ratio stocks (HML), and return difference of past 
winner and loser stocks (MOM). The regression results of a hypothetical strategy of buying high skilled 
fund portfolio and selling low skilled fund portfolio are also reported in this table. The sample period of the 
test months is from January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). The P-value and adjusted R2 for each 
regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
 



























cept 0.14* -0.12*** 
0.26**
* 0.06 -0.13*** 
0.18**
* 0.05 -0.11*** 0.16** 
 
(0.082) (<.001) (<.001) (0.304) (<.001) (0.004) (0.433) (<.001) (0.031) 
RM-













(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 
SMB 
   
0.27*** 0.05*** 0.22*** 0.27*** 0.05*** 
0.22**
* 
    
(<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) (<.001) 











 HML    0.19*** 0.02** 0.18*** 0.20*** 0.02 0.18***     (<.001) (0.052) (<.001) (<.001) (0.164) (<.001) 
MO
M       
0.02 -0.02*** 0.04*** 
       
(0.170) (<.001) (0.001) 
Adj. 
R2 0.89 0.99 0.14 0.94 0.99 0.41 0.94 0.99 0.42 
 
Table 6. The Effect of Fund Selectivity and Investor Sentiment on Fund Performance 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity, 
investor sentiment, and fund alphat-1, controlling for other fund characteristics. The 
dependent variable is fund alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return 
(over T-bill rate) in month t and the expected excess return of the same month. The 
expected excess return for each fund in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC 
model factor loadings from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC 
model factors in current month. This process is repeated by moving the estimation and 
test period one month at a time. The main independent variables are fund selectivity (1-
R2t-1), market sentiment (BW sentiment index, available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website), 
selectivity*sentiment, which is the product of selectivity and market sentiment, fund 
alphat-1, and Selectivity*Sentiment*Alphat-1, which is the product of these three variables. 
Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, 
log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of TNA. Following Amihud 
and Goyenko (2013), we show the results with and without alphat-1 as control variables, 
where Alphat-1 is the intercept from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1). Sample 
period covers from January 1990 through December 2014. In Panel B, we also report the 
results using transformed selectivity (TSelectivity), as we shown that R2 is highly 
negative skewed. The P-value and adjusted R2 for each regression are also presented. 
***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 10% level. 
Panel A: Using selectivity to measure skill 
 Fund Alpha 
 













(0.000) (0.009) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) 











 Selectivity 0.413***  0.479*** 0.454*** 0.476*** 0.500***  (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) Alphat-1 0.303*** 0.333*** 0.319*** 0.319*** 0.257*** 0.259*** 















(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Selectivity*Sentiment 
   
0.172** 
  




    
0.493*** 0.486*** 
 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Market Dispersion 
     
0.027** 
 
     
(0.000) 
Business Cycle 
     
0.043*** 
 
     
(0.000) 
Turnover 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense Ratio -0.010 0.000 -0.010 -0.010 -0.019 -0.020 
 
(0.430) (0.983) (0.426) (0.435) (0.145) (0.124) 
log(TNA) 0.296*** 0.255*** 0.279*** 0.281*** 0.293*** 0.318*** 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
[log(TNA)]2 -0.027** -0.020* -0.024** -0.024** -0.026** -0.029** 
 












  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.009 0.010 













Panel B: Using logistic transformed selectivity to measure skill 
 Fund Alpha 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] 
Intercept -0.375*** 
-






(0.009) (0.009) (0.071) (0.066) (0.009) (0.000) 
TSelectivity 0.047*** 
 




(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Alphat-1 0.304*** 0.333*** 0.320*** 0.320*** 0.361*** 0.361*** 















(0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) 
TSelectivity*Sentiment 
   
0.019* 
  




    
0.145*** 0.146*** 
 
    
(0.000) (0.000) 
Market Dispersion 
     
0.026*** 
 
     
(0.000) 
Business Cycle 
     
0.027*** 
 
     
(0.010) 
Turnover 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Expense Ratio -0.015 0.000 -0.017 -0.017 -0.001 -0.002 
 
(0.259) (0.983) (0.196) (0.195) (0.950) (0.866) 
log(TNA) 0.297*** 0.255*** 0.281*** 0.283*** 0.314*** 0.345*** 











  (0.000) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) [log(TNA)]2 -0.027** -0.020* -0.025** -0.025** -0.028** -0.032*** 
 












  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.011 0.012 
 
Table 7. Skill versus Luck on the Fund Performance Using Fund Alpha to Measure 
Performance 
Fund performance is measured using fund alpha based on FFC model. Panel A shows the 
estimated proportions of zero-alpha, unskilled, and skilled funds in the funds population 
with the monthly average fund number in each category based on Barras, Scaillet, and 
Wermers (2010)’s methodology of false discoveries. It also exhibits the proportion of 
funds in the right and left tails using four significant levels (0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20). 
The significant proportion in left tail is divided into unlucky and unskilled categories, and 
the significant proportion in right tail is divided into lucky and skilled categories. 
Average fund alpha and fund alpha standard division are also reported. Panel B and C 
show the results of false discoveries analysis during high and low sentiment periods. The 
BW sentiment index is used to capture market sentiment and is available at Jeffrey 
Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than 
the median number of all monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as 
high (low) market sentiment month. 









      
Proportion 84.29% 11.30% 4.41% 
      
Ave. # of funds 893 164 89 




Right Tail  
Significant level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 









% Signif. % 











 # of funds 66 104 134 164  89 70 51 30 # of funds unlucky % 1.24% 2.55% 3.72% 6.10%  3.26% 2.43% 1.64% 0.79% lucky % 
# of funds 18 37 54 89 
 
66 49 33 16 # of funds 









% skilled % 
# of funds 48 67 80 91 
 
24 21 18 14 # of funds 
Alpha (% 
/month) -0.277 -0.321 -0.340 -0.354  
0.826 0.884 0.961 1.081 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 1.979 1.985 1.995 2.007 
 
3.434 3.537 3.670 3.530 Alpha Stdv. 
 







d        
Proportion 84.84% 10.06% 5.10% 
       
Ave. # of funds 876 142 102 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 









% Signif. % 
# of funds 55 88 116 142 
 
102 82 61 37 # of funds 









% lucky % 
# of funds 17 35 52 69 
 
67 51 34 17 # of funds 









% skilled % 
# of funds 38 53 64 73 
 
35 31 27 20 # of funds 
Alpha (% 
/month) -0.764 -0.743 -0.707 -0.686  
0.832 0.899 0.996 1.143 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 2.038 2.042 2.055 2.078 
 
3.780 3.934 4.115 3.924 Alpha Stdv. 







d        

















Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 











% Signif. % 
# of funds 78 120 153 185 
 
75 58 41 23 # of funds 









% lucky % 
# of funds 20 39 58 77 
 
62 47 31 15 # of funds 









% skilled % 
# of funds 58 81 95 108 
 
13 11 10 8 # of funds 
Alpha (% 
/month) -0.197 -0.224 -0.236 -0.245  
0.814 0.854 0.884 0.939 Alpha (% /month) 
Alpha Stdv. 1.958 1.959 1.965 1.971 
 
2.579 2.490 2.418 2.380 Alpha Stdv. 
 
Table 8. Skill versus Luck on the Fund Performance Using Value-added Fund 
Alpha to Measure Performance 
Fund performance is measured using value-added fund alpha based on 11 Vanguard 
Index Fund orthogonal bases. Panel A shows the estimated proportions of zero-alpha, 
unskilled, and skilled funds in the funds population with the monthly average fund 
number in each category based on Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers (2010)’s methodology 
of false discoveries. It also exhibits the proportion of funds in the right and left tails using 
four significant levels (0.05, 0.10, 0.15, and 0.20). The significant proportion in left tail is 
divided into unlucky and unskilled categories, and the significant proportion in right tail 
is divided into lucky and skilled categories. Average value-added fund alpha and value-
added fund alpha standard division are also reported. Panel B and C show the results of 
false discoveries analysis during high and low sentiment periods. The sentiment index 
data are available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website. If the BW sentiment index for the test 
month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all monthly BW sentiment index 
numbers, we define this month as high (low) market sentiment month. 
Panel A: Proportion of Unskilled and Skilled Funds 











  Zero Alpha Unskilled Skilled        Proportion 82.20% 10.27% 7.52% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1261 158 115 




Right Tail  
Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 









% 3.73% Signif. % 
# of funds 78 114 139 158 
 
115 102 86 57 # of funds 









% 2.25% lucky % 
# of funds 46 47 47 48 
 
33 34 37 35 # of funds 









% 1.48% skilled % 
# of funds 32 67 91 110 
 
83 68 49 23 # of funds 
Value-added 




























       
Proportion 77.47% 11.13% 
11.40
% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1219 175 179 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 










8% Signif. % 
# of funds 87 126 154 175  179 159 133 91 # of funds 










6% lucky % 











 # of funds 47 47 48 48  44 46 48 48 # of funds unskilled % 2.53% 5.01% 6.78% 8.06%  8.60% 7.19% 5.41% 2.71% skilled % 
# of funds 40 79 107 127  135 113 85 43 # of funds 
Value-added Alpha 









Stdv. 2.916 2.650 2.323 3.612 
 2.203 2.58 2.37 2.291 
Value-added 
Alpha Stdv. 








       
Proportion 86.87% 9.42% 3.71% 
       
Ave. # of funds 1298 141 55 






Sig. level 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 
 
0.20 0.15 0.10 0.05 Sig. level 










2% Signif. % 
# of funds 69 102 124 141  55 49 41 26 # of funds 










5% lucky % 
# of funds 45 46 47 48  22 24 26 22 # of funds 










7% skilled % 
# of funds 25 56 77 93  33 26 15 4 # of funds 
Value-added Alpha 









Stdv. 3.199 4.132 2.957 2.558 
 2.992 2.944 2.614 2.478 
Value-added 
Alpha Stdv. 
Table 9. Stock Mispricing and Mutual Fund Performance 
This table presents the coefficient between fund performance and fund mispricing level, along with the 
corresponding P-value and regression adjusted R2, by regressing fund performance on fund level 
mispricing for each management skill quintile while controlling for past fund performance (Alphat-1), 
expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, log value of total net assets (TNA), and squared log 
value of TNA. Fund performance is estimated using both Fund Alpha and value-added Fund Alpha 












measures. Fund level mispricing is measured using two ways: (i) VW_MISP is the market value weighted 
average of stock mispricing for all stocks within each fund and (ii) EW_MISP is the equal weighted 
average of stock mispricing for all stocks within each fund. Stock mispricing value is introduced by 
Stambaugh et al. (2012) and the data are available through Yu Yuan’s website 
(http://www.saif.sjtu.edu.cn/facultylist/yyuan/). Furthermore, the sample is split into quintiles based on 
their selectivity or value-added skill, which are estimated using 24-month regression from October 2011 to 
September 2013. Fund holdings information are manually collected through Bloomberg Portfolio Analysis 
Database, and the data are collected for the last quarter of 2013. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 
5% or 10% level. 
 
 
Fund Alpha (FFC model) 
 











P-Value (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000) (0.008) (0.007) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 











P-Value (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (0.000) (<.0001) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.108 0.134 0.118 0.155 0.165 0.135 
 
Value-added Fund Alpha 
 






3.470*** -7.799** -1.671 -0.604** 0.061 -2.455 
P value (0.005) (0.037) (0.132) (0.034) (0.973) (0.583) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.090 0.095 0.181 0.181 0.038 0.030 
EW_MIS
P -3.098** -8.018** -2.013* -0.461 0.709 -0.353 
P value (0.012) (0.037) (0.083) (0.104) (0.702) (0.933) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R2 0.089 0.095 0.184 0.172 0.020 0.028 













Table 10. The Effect of Fund Capital Inflows and Investor Sentiment on Fund 
Performance 
Notes: This table reports the results of regressing fund alpha on manager’s selectivity, 
investor sentiment, fund alphat-1, and fund capital inflows in previous two months (Flowt-
1 and Flowt-2), controlling for other fund characteristics. The dependent variable is fund 
alpha, which is the difference between fund excess return (over T-bill rate) in month t and 
the expected excess return of the same month. The expected excess return for each fund 
in month t is calculated by multiplying the FFC model factor loadings from the 24-month 
estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by the FFC model factors in current month. This process is 
repeated by moving the estimation and test period one month at a time. The main 
independent variables are fund selectivity (1-R2t-1), market sentiment (BW sentiment 
index, available at Jeffrey Wurgler’s website), fund alphat-1, previous fund flows, and 
their interactive variables. Control variables contain Alphat-1, which is the intercept from 
the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1), expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund 
turnover, log value of fund total net assets (TNA), and squared log value of fund TNA. 
Sample period covers from January 1990 through December 2014. The P-value and 
adjusted R2 for each regression are also presented. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 




[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] 
Intercept -1.126*** -1.017*** -1.307*** -1.097*** -1.127*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Selectivity 
  
0.405*** 0.376*** 0.442*** 
 
  











Alphat-1 0.325*** 0.340*** 0.329*** 0.329*** 0.311*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Flowt-1 -0.006** -0.004 -0.067*** -0.004 0.001 
 
(0.040) (0.275) (0.000) (0.264) (0.642) 
Flowt-2 0.003 0.006* -0.027*** 0.006* -0.003 
 
(0.350) (0.065) (0.000) (0.068) (0.324) 


















  Flowt-1*Sentiment 
 
0.000 




   Flowt-2*Sentiment 
 
-0.002 




   Flowt-1*Selectivity*Alphat-1 
    
0.063*** 
 
    
(0.000) 
Flowt-2*Selectivity*Alphat-1 
    
0.075*** 
 
    
(0.000) 
Turnover 0.000*** 0.000*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Expense ratio -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Log(TNA) 0.631*** 0.597*** 0.710*** 0.617*** 0.628*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
[Log(TNA)]2 -0.066*** -0.061*** -0.079*** -0.064*** -0.065*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Log(age) -0.084*** -0.102*** -0.077*** -0.098*** -0.100*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Adj. R2 0.009 0.009 0.012 0.010 0.016 
 
  












Table 11. Fama-MacBeth Regressions of Fund Returns and Alpha on Sentiment 
Beta 
This table reports results from Fama-MacBeth regressions of high skilled and low skilled fund portfolios’ 
excess returns, as well as alphas, on funds’ sentiment beta with controls of fund characteristics. In each 
month and for each portfolio with 24 monthly returns, sentiment beta is estimated by regressing the fund’s 
excess returns on the BW sentiment index along with controls from FFC factor model. Then, we perform 
cross-sectional regressions of fund excess return (or alpha) on sentiment beta with controls for fund 
characteristics. Fund-level control variables contain expense ratio, log value of fund age, fund turnover, and 
log value of TNA. Sample period covers from January 1990 through December 2014. ***, **, * denotes 


















































































































Table 12. The Effect of Volatility Anomaly and Investor Sentiment on Fund 
Performance 
The table presents the portfolio alpha, annualized, using monthly returns, in high and low market sentiment 
periods. If the BW sentiment index for the test month (t) is higher (lower) than the median number of all 
monthly BW sentiment index numbers, we define this month as high (low) market sentiment month. 
Portfolios are formed by sorting all funds in each month into quintiles by lagged R2 and then by fund alphat-
1. Both are obtained from the 24-month estimation period (t-24 to t-1) by regressing each fund’s monthly 












excess returns (over the T-bill rate) on the factors from FFC model. Then, for the following month (t), we 
calculate the average monthly excess returns for each fund portfolio. The process is repeated by moving the 
estimation and test period one month at a time. Last we regress the test period average portfolio returns on 
Fama-French 5 factor plus momentum model. For each portfolio cell, we present portfolio alpha, which is 
the intercept from the above regression, and the P-value. The sample period of the test months is from 
January 1990 to December 2014 (300 months). Panel A shows the results of high market sentiment group 
and Panel B shows the results of low market sentiment group. For each portfolio, we present the portfolio 
alpha, annualized, using monthly returns and the P-value. ***, **, * denotes significance at the 1%, 5% or 
10% level. 
Panel A: FF 5 factor plus momentum model in high market sentiment 
 
Fund selectivity (1-R2t-1) 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All 
Low -2.28*** -3.59*** -3.50*** -3.94*** -1.66 -3.00*** 
 
(0.005) (0.002) (0.008) (0.005) (0.363) (0.003) 
2 -2.67*** -1.57* -3.41*** -2.31** -0.77 -2.14*** 
 
(<.001) (0.073) (<.001) (0.047) (0.593) (0.010) 
3 -1.59*** -1.77** -2.90*** -1.74* -0.73 -1.74** 
 
(0.009) (0.019) (0.002) (0.099) (0.556) (0.012) 
4 -0.84 -0.82 -0.61 -0.20 -0.06 -0.50 
 
(0.265) (0.340) (0.491) (0.870) (0.967) (0.506) 
High -0.41 0.59 1.70 4.54*** 6.66*** 2.63** 
 
(0.746) (0.707) (0.159) (0.003) (0.002) (0.013) 
All -1.56** -1.44* -1.75** -0.75 0.68 -0.96 
 
(0.013) (0.059) (0.038) (0.469) (0.563) (0.178) 
Panel B: FF 5 factor plus momentum model in low market sentiment 
Alphat-1 Low 2 3 4 High All 
Low -1.24** -0.05 -0.85 -1.09 -2.26 -1.09 
 
(0.027) (0.953) (0.317) (0.274) (0.271) (0.173) 
2 -0.56 -0.51 -0.04 -0.01 0.71 -0.09 
 
(0.244) (0.311) (0.943) (0.990) (0.566) (0.874) 
3 -0.20 -0.24 -0.50 -0.30 0.96 -0.05 
 
(0.697) (0.650) (0.386) (0.680) (0.395) (0.916) 











 4 -1.05* -1.08 0.74 -0.63 2.30* 0.06  (0.071) (0.374) (0.257) (0.426) (0.059) (0.906) High -0.34 0.75 0.92 1.96* 1.93 1.04 
 
(0.629) (0.341) (0.277) (0.081) (0.247) (0.142) 
All -0.68* -0.22 0.06 -0.02 0.75 -0.02 
 
(0.084) (0.648) (0.891) (0.969) (0.426) (0.961) 
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